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Abstract. This paper establishes tight bounds on the best-case time-complexity of distributed atomic
read/write storage implementations that tolerate worst-case conditions. We study asynchronous robust
implementations where a writer and a set of reader processes (clients) access an atomic storage imple-
mented over a set of 2t+ b+ 1 server processes of which t can fail: b of these can be malicious and the
rest can fail by crashing. We define a lucky operation (read or write) as one that runs synchronously
and without contention. We determine the exact conditions under which a lucky operation can be fast,
namely expedited in one-communication round-trip with no data authentication. We show that every
lucky write (resp., read) can be fast despite fw (resp., fr) actual failures, if and only if fw + fr ≤ t− b.
Keywords: Atomic storage, Shared-memory emulations, Arbitrary failures, Optimal resilience,
Time-complexity.
1 Introduction
It is considered good practice to plan for the worst and hope for the best. This practice has in
particular governed many complexity studies in dependable distributed computing [9, 10,19].
It is indeed admitted that distributed algorithms ought to tolerate bad conditions with many
processes failing or competing for shared resources such as communication channels. Under these
conditions, the distributed system is clearly asynchronous as there is no realistic bound on relative
process speeds and communication delays.
Fortunately, those bad conditions are considered rare and whilst it is good to make sure algo-
rithms tolerate them when they happen, one would rather optimize the algorithms for the common,
not that bad conditions. It is for instance often argued that distributed systems are synchronous
most of the time, that there is generally little contention on the same resources at any given point in
time [4] and that failures are rare. Hence, when measuring the complexity of a distributed algorithm
and judging whether the algorithm is fast, it is reasonable to measure its (time) complexity under
such best case conditions. An algorithm that would be efficient under rare worst case conditions
and slow under frequent best case conditions, would not be practically appealing.
In this paper, we study distributed algorithms that implement the classical single-writer multi-
reader (SWMR) atomic storage abstraction [17]: a fundamental notion in dependable distributed
computing [3,20]. This abstraction, also called the SWMR atomic register, captures the semantics
of a shared variable on which processes, called clients, can concurrently invoke read and write
operations. Atomicity stipulates that (1) a read r must return a value written by a concurrent
write (if any), or the last value written, and (2) if a read r′ that precedes r returns value v, then r
must return either v or a later value.
We consider robust, sometimes called wait-free, implementations of an atomic storage where no
client relies on any other client to complete any of its operations: the other clients might have all
stopped their computation (crashed) [2, 14, 17]. The storage abstraction is implemented over a set
of 2t+ b+ 1 server processes of which t can fail: b of these can be malicious, deviating arbitrarily
from the algorithm assigned to them, while the rest can crash. In this paper, we assume that stored
data is not authenticated.1
It is a known result that 2t + b + 1 is a resilience lower bound for any safe [17] storage im-
plementation in an asynchronous system [21]2 and, to ensure atomicity with this resilience, more
than one communication-round trip is needed between a client (the writer or the readers) and the
servers [1, 11]. In [2] for instance, even if only server crashes are tolerated (i.e., b = 0), the reader
needs to send a message to all servers, wait for their replies, determine the latest value, send another
message to all servers, wait for replies, and then return the value. A total of two communication
round-trips is thus required for every read operation.
The goal of this paper is to determine the exact conditions under which optimally resilient
implementations that tolerate asynchrony and contention (worst-case conditions), can expedite
operations (reads or writes) whenever the system is synchronous and there is no contention. We
say that an operation is lucky if (a) it runs synchronously and (b) without contention. In short, this
means that (a) the client that invokes the operation reaches and receives replies from all non-faulty
servers in one communication round-trip, and (b) no other client is invoking a conflicting operation
(no read is overlapping with a write).
We define the notion of a fast operation as one that executes in one communication round-trip
between a client and the servers. Indeed, it is usual to measure the time complexity of an operation
by counting the number of communication rounds needed to complete that operation, irrespective
1 For completeness, we consider the impact of using data authentication in Section 5.
2 Actually, [21] proves the optimal resilience lower bound for the special case where b = t. It is not difficult to extend
this result for b 6= t using the same technique.
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of the local computation complexity at any process involved in the operation (server or client). The
rationale behind this measure is that local computation is negligible with respect to communication
rounds (assuming data is authenticated).
This paper shows that in order for every lucky write to be fast, despite at most fw actual server
failures, and every lucky read to be fast, despite at most fr actual server failures, it is necessary and
sufficient that the sum fw + fr is not greater than t− b. This result expresses the precise tradeoff
between the thresholds fw and fr.
We proceed as follows. We first give an algorithm with 2t+b+1 servers that tolerates asynchrony
and t server failures among which b can be malicious: the algorithm allows every lucky read (resp.,
lucky write) to be fast in any execution where up to fw (resp., fr) servers fail, provided fw+fr = t−b.
Note that all fw (resp. fr) failures can be malicious, provided fw ≤ b (resp. fr ≤ b). The challenge
underlying the design of our algorithm is the ability to switch to slower operations that preserve
atomicity under the worst conditions: asynchrony and contention, as well as t failures out of which b
can be malicious, with 2t+b+1 servers (optimal resilience [21]). A key component of our algorithm
is a signalling mechanism we call “freezing”, used by the reader to inform the writer of the presence
of contention. Interestingly, this mechanism does not rely on intercommunication among servers,
nor on servers pushing messages to the clients.
We then give our matching upper bound result by showing that no optimally resilient asyn-
chronous algorithm can have every lucky write be fast despite fw actual server failures and every
lucky read be fast despite fr actual server failures, if fw + fr > t − b. Our upper bound proof
is based on indistinguishability arguments that exploit system asynchrony, the possibility of some
servers to return an arbitrary value, and the requirement that every write wr (resp., read rd) must
be fast whenever wr (resp., rd) is lucky and at most fw (resp., fr) servers are faulty. To strengthen
our tight bound, we assume in our proof a general model in which servers can exchange messages
and even send unsolicited messages.
We use the very fact that our upper bound proof requires every lucky operation (in particular,
every lucky read) to be fast, to (1) drastically increase the sum of the thresholds fw and fr to
fw = t − b and fr = t, by allowing a certain number, yet just a small fraction, of lucky read
operations to be slow. We also highlight the fact that (2) our upper bound is inherent to atomic
storage implementations, but does not apply to weaker semantics; we discuss how to modify our
algorithm and get a regular [17] storage implementation in which every lucky write (resp., read) is
fast despite the failure of fw = t− b (resp., fr = t) servers. We prove the optimality of (1) and (2)
by showing, along the lines of [1], that no optimally resilient safe [17] algorithm can achieve fast
writes despite the failure of more than t− b servers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present in Section 2 our general system model
together with few definitions that are used in the rest of the paper. In Section 3 we present our
algorithm, which we prove optimal in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss several alternatives to
the assumptions underlying our result. We conclude the paper by discussing the related work in
Section 6.
2 System Model and Definitions
The distributed system we consider consists of three disjoint sets of processes: a set servers of size
S containing processes {s1, ..., sS}, a singleton writer containing a single process {w}, and a set
readers of size R containing processes {r1, ..., rR}. We denote a set of clients as a union of the sets
writer and readers. We assume that every client may communicate with any server by message
passing using point-to-point reliable communication channels. When presenting our algorithm, we
assume that servers send messages only in reply to a message received from a client: i.e., servers
do not communicate among each other, nor send unsolicited messages. However, to strengthen our
2
tight upper bound, we relax these assumptions. To simplify the presentation, we assume a global
clock, which, however, is not accessible to either clients or servers.
2.1 Runs and Algorithms
The state of the communication channel between processes p and q is viewed as a set msetp,q =
msetq,p containing messages that are sent but not yet received. We assume that every message has
two tags which identify the sender and the receiver. A distributed algorithm A is a collection of
automata. Computation of non-malicious processes proceeds in steps of A. A step of A is denoted
by a pair of process id and message set 〈p,M〉 (M might be ∅). In step sp = 〈p,M〉, process p
atomically does the following (we say that p takes step sp): (1) removes the messages in M from
msetp,∗, (2) applies M and its current state stp to Ap, which outputs a new state st′p and a set
of messages to be sent, and then (3) p adopts st′p as its new state and puts the output messages
in msetp,∗. A malicious process p can perform arbitrary actions: (1) it can remove/put arbitrary
messages from/into msetp,∗ and (2) it can change its state in an arbitrary manner. Note that the
malicious process p cannot remove/put any message into a point-to-point channel between any two
non-malicious processes q and r.
Given any algorithm A, a run of A is an infinite sequence of steps of A taken by non-malicious
processes, and actions of malicious processes, such that the following properties hold for each non-
malicious process p: (1) initially, for each non-malicious process q, msetp,q = ∅, (2) the current state
in the first step of p is a special state Init, (3) for each step 〈p,M〉 of A, and for every message
m ∈M , p is the receiver of m and ∃q,msetp,q that contains m immediately before the step 〈p,M〉
is taken, and (4) if there is a step that puts a message m in msetp,∗ such that p is the receiver of m
and p takes an infinite number of steps, then there is a subsequent step 〈p,M〉 such that m ∈ M .
A partial run is a finite prefix of some run. A (partial) run r extends some partial run pr if pr is a
prefix of r. At the end of a partial run, all messages that are sent but not yet received are said to
be in transit.
We say that a non-malicious process p is correct in a run r if p takes an infinite number of steps
of A in r. Otherwise a non-malicious process is crash-faulty. We say that a crash-faulty process
p crashes at step sp in a run, if sp is the last step of p in that run. Malicious and crash-faulty
processes are called faulty. In any run, at most t servers might be faulty, out of which at most b ≤ t
may be malicious. In this paper we consider only optimally resilient implementations [21], where
the total number of servers S equals 2t+ b+ 1.
For presentation simplicity, we do not explicitly model the initial state of a process, nor the
invocations and responses of the read/write operations of the atomic storage to be implemented.
We assume that the algorithm A initializes the processes, and schedules invocation/response of
operations (i.e., A modifies the states of the processes accordingly). However, we say that p invokes
op at step sp, if A modifies the state of a process p in step sp so as to invoke an operation (and
similarly for response).
2.2 Atomic Register
A sequential (read/write) storage is a data structure accessed by a single process. It provides two
operations: WRITE(v), which stores v in the storage, and READ(), which returns the last value
stored. An atomic storage is a distributed data structure that may be concurrently accessed by
multiple clients and yet provides an “illusion” of a sequential storage to the accessing clients.
We refer the readers to [14,15,17,20] for a formal definition of an atomic storage, and we simply
recall below what is required to state and prove our results.
We assume that each client invokes at most one operation at a time (i.e., does not invoke
the next operation until it receives the response for the current one). Only readers invoke READ
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operations and only the writer invokes WRITE operations. We further assume that the initial value
of a storage is a special value ⊥, which is not a valid input value for a WRITE. We say that an
operation op is complete in a (partial) run if the run contains a response step for op. In any run, we
say that a complete operation op1 precedes operation op2 (or op2 succeeds op1) if the response step
of op1 precedes the invocation step of op2 in that run. If neither op1 nor op2 precede the other, the
operations are said to be concurrent.
An algorithm implements a robust atomic storage if every run of the algorithm satisfies wait-
freedom and atomicity properties. Wait-freedom states that if a client invokes an operation and
does not crash, eventually the client receives a response (i.e., operation completes), independently
of the possible crashes of any other client. Here we give a definition of atomicity for the SWMR
atomic storage.
In the single-writer setting, WRITEs in a run have a natural ordering which corresponds to
their physical order. Denote by wrk the kth WRITE in a run (k ≥ 1), and by valk the value written
by the kth WRITE. Let val0 = ⊥. We say that a partial run satisfies atomicity if the following
properties hold: (1) if a READ returns x then there is k such that valk = x, (2) if a READ rd is
complete and it succeeds some WRITE wrk (k ≥ 1), then rd returns vall such that l ≥ k, (3) if a
READ rd returns valk (k ≥ 1), then wrk either precedes rd or is concurrent to rd, and (4) if some
READ rd1 returns valk (k ≥ 0) and a READ rd2 that succeeds rd1 returns vall, then l ≥ k.
2.3 Lucky Operations
A complete READ/WRITE operation op by the client c is called synchronous, if the message
propagation time for every message m exchanged in time period [topinv , topresp ], where op is invoked
at topinv and completed at time topresp , between client c and any server si is bounded by the constant
tc,si known to the client c. A complete operation op is contention-free if it is not concurrent with
any other WRITE wr. An operation op is lucky if it is synchronous and contention-free. Note that,
in our SWMR setting, every synchronous WRITE operation is lucky.
2.4 Fast Operations
Basically, we say that a complete operation op is fast if op completes in one communication round;
otherwise, op is slow. In other words, in a fast READ (resp., WRITE):
1. The reader (resp., writer) sends messages to a subset of servers in the system (possibly all
servers).
2. Servers on receiving such a message reply to the reader (resp., writer) before receiving any other
messages. More precisely, any server si on receiving a messagem in step sp1 = 〈si,M〉 (m ∈M),
where m is sent by the reader (resp., writer) on invoking a READ (resp., WRITE), replies to m
either in step sp1 itself, or in a subsequent step sp2, such that si does not receive any message
in any step between sp1 and sp2 (including sp2). Intuitively, this requirement forbids the server
to wait for some other message before replying to m.
3. upon the reader (resp., writer) receives a sufficient number k of such replies, a READ (resp.,
WRITE) completes.
3 Algorithm
Proposition 1. There is an optimally resilient implementation I of a SWMR robust atomic stor-
age, such that: (1) in any partial run in which at most fw servers fail, every lucky WRITE operation
is fast, and (2) in any partial run in which at most fr servers fail, every lucky READ operation is
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fast, where fw + fr = t− b.
In the following, we first give an overview of the algorithm. This is followed by detailed descrip-
tions of the WRITE and READ implementations. Finally, in Section 3.4, we prove the correctness
of our algorithm.
3.1 Overview
If a WRITE is synchronous (i.e., lucky) and at most fw servers are faulty, the WRITE is fast and
completes in a single (communication) round. A slow WRITE takes an additional two rounds. The
READ operation also proceeds in series of rounds (a fast READ, completes in a single round). In
every round, a client sends a message to all servers and awaits a response from S−t different servers.
In addition, in the first round of every operation, a client c awaits responses until the expiration of
the timer, set according to the message propagation bounds tc,s∗ (see Section 2.3).
Roughly speaking, a fast WRITE, writes the new value in at least S − fw servers. Consider a
lucky READ rd, such that the last WRITE that precedes rd is a fast WRITE wr that writes vfast
and that at most fr servers are faulty. In this case, vfast is written into at least S− fw servers, out
of which a set X containing at least S − fw − fr = 2b + t + 1 servers are correct. Since no value
later than vfast is written before rd completes (since rd is lucky), all servers from the set X will
respond with vfast in the first round of rd. Similarly, if wr is a slow WRITE, in every (out of three)
rounds, wr writes vslow to at least S − t servers. In this case, a lucky READ rd that comes after
wr will read, in its first round, a value vslow written in the third (final) round of wr from at least
S − t− fr ≥ b+ 1 correct servers. In both cases, our algorithm guarantees that rd is fast and that
it returns vfast (resp., vslow) at the end of the first round.
However, since rd is fast, it does not send any additional messages to servers after the first
round. Therefore, when returning a value v, a fast READ rd must itself “leave” behind enough
information so the subsequent READS will not return the older value. This is precisely the case,
when rd encounters a set X containing at least 2b + t + 1 (resp., b + 1) servers that “witness” a
fast (resp., slow) WRITE. To illustrate this, consider a READ rd′ by some reader rj that succeeds
rd. In addition, for simplicity, assume that no WRITE operation that succeeds wr is invoked
(naturally, the correctness of our algorithm does not rely on this assumption). In case wr is fast,
rj is guaranteed to receive a response from at least 2b+ t+ 1− (t+ b) = b+ 1 servers that belong
to the set X, in every round of rd′, overwhelming the number of responses from malicious servers
(at most b) that may be trying to mislead rj . Now consider the case where wr is slow. Out of at
least b + 1 servers that “witness” a third (final) round of wr and respond to a fast READ rd, at
least one is non-malicious, which means that the second round of the write wr completed and a
set Y containing at least S − t − b = t + 1 non-malicious servers “witnessed” the second round of
wr. Reader rj is guaranteed to receive a response from at least one non-malicious server si, that
belongs to the set Y in every round of rd′. Roughly speaking, si claims that the first round of wr
completed and that a set Z of at least S − t− t = b+ 1 correct servers “witnessed” the first round
of wr. All the servers from set Z will eventually respond to rd′ confirming the claims of si.
A value v is returned only if at least b+1 servers report the exact value v. Since servers do not
store the entire history of all the values they receive, in the case the writer issues an unbounded
number of WRITEs and if readers do not inform the writer about their (slow) READs, server data
can repeatedly be overwritten. This leads to the impossibility of confirming any value at b + 1
servers. To solve this issue, our algorithm employs a careful signalling between the readers and the
writer, a mechanism we call freezing. Roughly, to initiate freezing, a slow READ rd′ by reader rj
writes its own timestamp ts′rj to all servers. Every server si appends ts
′
rj to its reply to the first
round message of every subsequent WRITE (until the writer “freezes” the value for rd′). As soon
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as the writer receives ts′rj from at least b + 1 different servers, the writer “freezes” the value for
rd′ and writes it in the dedicated server field, frozenrj . Our algorithm guarantees that the writer
“freezes” at most one value per (slow) READ. The READ rd′ reads the servers’ value of frozenrj
and is guaranteed to eventually return a value.
Finally, a slow READ writes back the value v it returns in a well-known manner [2]. The
writeback procedure follows the communication pattern of the WRITE operation and, hence, takes
three communication rounds.
3.2 WRITE implementation
The pseudocode of the WRITE implementation is given in Figure 1. The writer maintains the
following local variables: (1) a local timestamp ts initially set to ts0, (2) a timestamp-value pairs
pw and w initially set to 〈ts0,⊥〉, (3) array read ts[∗] initially set to read ts[rj ] = 〈tsr0〉, for every
reader rj , where tsr0 is the initial local timestamp at every reader (see Section 3.3).
The WRITE operation consists of two phases: pre-write (PW) phase and write (W) phase. The
writer w begins the PW phase of operation wr =WRITE(v) by increasing its local timestamp ts,
updating its pw variable to reflect the new timestamp-value pair 〈ts, v〉 and triggering the timer T
(line 3). Then, the writer sends the PW 〈ts, pw,w, frozen〉 message to all servers (line 4). The field
frozen of the PW message is sent optionally in case the writer has to “freeze” a value for some
ongoing READ. On reception of a PW 〈ts, pw′, w′, ∗〉 message, every server updates its local copy
of pw and w, if these are older than pw′ and w′, respectively. Even if PW.pw′ and PW.w′ are older
than the servers’ local copies pw and w, servers take into account the information in the frozen field
of the PW message (lines 5-6, Fig. 3). Servers reply to the writer with a PW ACK〈ts, newread〉
message. In the optional newread field, servers inform the writer about the slow READS that have
difficulties returning a value.
Initialization:
1: pw := w := 〈ts0,⊥〉; ts := ts0; T := timer(); frozen := ∅;
2: ∀rj |rj ∈ readers : read ts[rj ] := tsr0
WRITE(v) is {
3: inc(ts); pw := 〈ts, v〉; trigger(T ) % pre-write (PW) phase
4: send PW 〈ts, pw,w, frozen〉 to all servers
5: wait for PW ACKi〈ts, newread〉 from S − t servers and expired(T)
6: frozen := ∅; w := 〈ts, v〉
7: freezevalues()
8: if PW ACKi〈ts, ∗〉 received from S − fw servers then return(OK)
9: for round= 2 to 3 do % write (W) phase
10: send W 〈round, ts, pw〉 to all servers
11: wait for reception of WRITE ACKi〈round, ts〉 from S − t servers
12: return(OK) }
freezevalues() is {
13: (∀rj , |{i : (PW ACKi.ts = ts) ∧ ((〈rj , tsrj 〉 ∈
∈ PW ACKi.newread) ∧ (tsrj > read ts[rj ]))}| ≥ b+ 1 do
14: read ts[rj ] := b+ 1
st highest value tsrj
15: frozen := frozen ∪ 〈rj , pw, read ts[rj ]〉 }
Fig. 1. WRITE implementation (writer)
In the PW phase, the writer awaits both for valid responses 3 to the PW message from S − t
different servers and the expiration of the timer. The writer completes the PW phase by executing
3 A valid response to a PW 〈ts, ∗, ∗, ∗〉 message is a PW ACK〈ts, ∗〉 message, with the same ts.
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the freezevalues() procedure, that consists of local computations only (line 7). If the writer received
at least S − fw valid PW ACK messages, the WRITE completes. Otherwise, the writer proceeds
to the second, W phase.
The freezevalues() procedure detects ongoing slow READS. Namely, in every READ invoca-
tion, the reader rj increases its local timestamp tsrj and, unless the READ is fast, rj stores this
timestamp into servers’ variable tsrj . In every round of WRITE operation, servers piggyback those
timestamps along the id of the issuing reader to PW ACK message within the newread field, in
case the writer did not already “freeze” a value for this READ (lines 5-7 Fig. 3). When the writer
detects b+1 servers that report a timestamp for the reader rj (tsrj ) higher than the writer’s locally
stored value of read ts[rj ] (line 13, Fig. 1), the writer updates its read ts[rj ] value to the b + 1st
highest tsrj value received in the newread fields of the valid responses to the PW message (line
14, Fig. 1) and “freezes” the current value of the timestamp value pair pw for the reader rj , by
assigning frozen := frozen ∪ 〈rj , pw, read ts[rj ]〉. The set frozen is sent to all servers within the
PW message of the next WRITE invocation. On reception of a PW message with a non-empty field
frozen, servers update their local variables frozenrj if the frozen value matches the timestamp
tsrj stored at the server, or if it is newer (line 6, Fig. 3). The freezevalues() procedure ensures
wait-freedom in runs in which the writer issues an unbounded number of WRITEs.
The write (W) phase takes two rounds. Pseudocode of W phase is depicted in lines 9-12, Fig. 1
and lines 12-17, Fig. 3. In each of the rounds, the writer sends the W 〈round, ts, pw〉 message to all
servers and awaits S − t valid responses from different servers. At the end of the second round of
W phase, WRITE completes.
3.3 READ implementation
The pseudocode of our READ implementation is given in Figure 2. At the beginning of every READ
operation, the reader rj increases its local timestamp tsrj . The reader rj proceeds by repeatedly
invoking rounds (until it can safely return a value) that consist of: (1) reading the latest values of
the server variables pw, w, vw and frozenrj and (2) writing the timestamp tsrj to variable tsrj
at every server. In every round rj awaits S − t server responses. The first round of every READ is
specific: (1) rj does not write tsrj to servers and (2) rj waits for both at least S − t responses and
for the timer triggered at the beginning of the round to expire.
A reader rj maintains the following local variables: (1) arrays pwi, wi, vwi, frozeni, 1 ≤ i ≤ S
that keep the latest copy of the server’s si variables pw, w, vw and frozenrj and (2) a local
timestamp tsrj , that is increased once at the beginning of every READ invocation. We define the
predicates readLive(c, i) and readFrozen(c, i) in lines 1 and 2 of Figure 2, respectively, to denote
that: (1) a timestamp-value pair c is seen in the latest copy of either the variable pwi, or the variable
wi of the server si (readLive(c, i)), and (2) a timestamp-value pair c is seen in the latest copy of the
frozenrj .pw of the server si, under the condition that the last value of frozenrj .tsr of the server
si is tsrj , the current local READ timestamp (readFrozen(c, i)).
A reader rj can only return a value c.val if a timestamp-value pair c is safe or safeFrozen (lines
3,4 and 18, Fig. 2), i.e., cmust have been either (a) readLive(c, ∗) (for safe) or (b) readFrozen(c, ∗)
(for safeFrozen), for at least b + 1 different servers. Moreover, unless the reader return c.val
such that c is safeFrozen (but c is rather safe), every other timestamp-value pair c′ that is
readLive(c, i) for some si with a higher timestamp (or the value v′ 6= v with the same timestamp)
must be deemed invalidw (line 8, Fig. 2) and invalidpw (line 9, Fig. 2), i.e., highCand(c) must
hold (lines 10 and 18, Fig. 2). The predicate invalidw(c) holds if S − t servers respond (either in
pwi or wi variables) with a timestamp-value pair with a timestamp less than c.ts or with the same
timestamp as c.ts but with a value different than c.val. Similarly, the predicate invalidpw(c) holds
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Definitions and Initialization:
1: readLive(c, i) ::= (pwi = c) ∨ (wi = c)
2: readFrozen(c, i) ::= (frozeni.pw = c) ∧ (frozeni.tsr = tsr)
3: safe(c) ::= |{i : readLive(c, i)}| ≥ b+ 1
4: safeFrozen(c) ::= |{i : readFrozen(c, i)}| ≥ b+ 1
5: fastpw(c) ::= (|{i : pwi = c}| ≥ 2b+ t+ 1)
6: fastvw(c) ::= (|{i : vwi = c}| ≥ b+ 1)
7: fast(c) ::= fastpw(c) ∨ fastvw(c)
8: invalidw(c) ::= |{i : ∃c′ : readLive(c′, i)∧
∧(c′ts < c.ts ∨ (c′.ts = c.ts ∧ c′.v 6= c.v))}| ≥ S − t
9: invalidpw(c) ::= |{i : ∃c′ : pw[i] = c′∧
∧(c′ts < c.ts ∨ (c′.ts = c.ts ∧ c′.v 6= c.v))}| ≥ S − b− t
10: highCand(c) ::= ∀c′∀i : (readLive(c′, i) ∧ c′.ts ≥ c.ts ∧ c′ 6= c)⇒
⇒ invalidw(c′) ∧ invalidpw(c′)
11: tsr := tsr0; T := timer();
READ() is {
12: inc(tsr);
13: rnd := 0; pwi := wi := 〈ts0,⊥〉,rndi := 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ S;
14: repeat
15: inc(rnd); if rnd = 1 then trigger(T )
16: send READ〈tsr, rnd〉 to all servers
17: wait for READ ACKi〈tsr, rnd, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗〉 from S − t servers and
and (expired(T ) or rnd > 1)
18: C := {c : (safe(c) and highCand(c)) or safeFrozen(c)}
19: until C 6= ∅
20: csel := (c.val : c ∈ C) ∧ (¬∃c′ ∈ C : c′.ts > c.ts)
21: if (¬fast(c) or (rnd > 1)) then writeback(csel)
22: return(csel.val)
23: upon receive READ ACKi〈tsr, rnd′, pw′, w′, vw′, frozen′j〉 from si
24: if (rnd′ > rndi) then
25: rndi := rnd
′; pwi := pw′; wi := w′;
vwi := vw
′; frozeni := frozen′j }
writeback(c) is {
26: for round= 1 to 3 do
27: send W 〈round, tsr, c〉 message to all servers
28: wait for receive WRITE ACKi〈round, tsr〉 from S − t servers }
Fig. 2. READ implementation (reader rj)
if S − b − t servers respond in their pw fields with a timestamp-value pair with a timestamp less
than c.ts or with the same timestamp as c.ts but with a value different than c.val.
When the reader selects a value c.val that is safe to return, and if this occurs at the end of the
first round of the READ invocation, the reader evaluates the predicate fast(c) (defined in line 7,
Figure 2), to determine whether it can skip the writeback procedure. The fast(c) holds if c appears
in at least b + 1 server vw fields or 2b + t + 1 servers’ pw fields. If the READ rd is lucky and at
most fr servers are faulty, the rd is guaranteed to terminate after only one round of the READ
invocation, and, hence, rd will be fast.
Indeed, if a last complete WRITE that preceded rd was a fast WRITE wr (resp., if wr is
slow), wr has written pw (resp., vw) fields of at least S − fw = t + 2b + fr + 1 servers (resp.,
S− t = t+ b+1). If a READ is lucky and at most fr servers are faulty, out of these S− fw servers
at least S − fw − fr = t + 2b + 1 (resp., S − t − fr ≥ S − 2t = b + 1) are correct and will send
the READ ACK message containing pw (resp., vw) (no new values are written after wr until rd
completes, since rd is contention-free) in the first round of READ. Since rd is synchronous, the
reader receives all the responses from all correct servers before the expiration of timer. Hence, the
predicate fastpw(pw) (resp., fastvw(vw)) holds, as well as predicates safe() and highCand() and
rd returns pw.val (resp., vw.val) without writing it back.
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Initialization:
1: pw,w, vw := 〈ts0,⊥〉; newread := ∅; ; tsrj := tsr0
2: ∀rj |rj ∈ readers : 〈frozenrj .pw, frozenrj .tsr〉 := 〈〈ts0,⊥〉, tsr0〉
3: upon receive PW 〈ts, pw′, w′, frozen〉 from the writer
4: update(pw, pw′); update(w,w′)
5: ∀j : 〈rj , pw′j , tsr′j〉 ∈ frozen do
6: if tsr′j ≥ tsrj then 〈frozenrj .pw, frozenrj .tsr〉 := 〈pw′j , tsr′j〉
7: newread :=
S〈rj , tsrj 〉, for all rj such that tsrj > frozenrj .tsr
8: send PW ACKi〈ts, newread〉 to the writer
9: upon receive READ〈tsr′, rnd′〉 from reader rj
10: if (tsr′ > tsrj ) and (rnd′ > 1) then tsrj := tsr
11: send READ ACKi〈tsr′, rnd′, pw,w, vw, frozenrj 〉 to rj
12: upon receive W 〈round, ts, c〉 from client clnt
13: update(pw, c)
14: if round > 1 then update(w, c)
15: if round > 2 then update(vw, c)
16: send WRITE ACKi〈round, ts〉 to clnt
update (localtsval, tsval) is {
17: if tsval.ts > localtsval.ts then localtsval := tsval}
Fig. 3. Code of server si
Otherwise, if rd is not lucky, or more than fr servers fail, the reader may have to write back
the value to servers. The writeback follows the communication pattern of the WRITE algorithm
(lines 26-28, Fig. 2).
3.4 Correctness
We first prove atomicity and then we proceed to wait-freedom and complexity. Note that in order
for rd to return a value c.val, it is necessary that c ∈ C (lines 18-20, Fig. 2). Therefore, if some
complete READ returns c.val then c must satisfy one of the following predicates (line 18, Fig 2):
(1) safe(c) ∧ highCand(c), or (2) safeFrozen(c). For simplicity of presentation, in the following,
if c satisfies predicate (1), we simply say that c is live, and if c satisfies predicate (2), we say that
c is frozen.
Furthermore, for simplicity of presentation, when we say that a server responds to the client we
assume that this response is a PW −ACK, WRITE −ACK or READ−ACK message. A valid
response to a writer’s PW 〈ts, ∗, ∗, ∗〉 message is a PW −ACK message with the same timestamp
ts, i.e., a PW −ACK〈ts, ∗〉 message. Similarly, a valid response to a W 〈round, ts, ∗〉 message or a
WB〈round, ts, ∗〉 is a WRITE −ACK〈round, ts〉 message. A valid response to a READ message
is defined analogously.
Lemma 1. No-creation. If a READ rd completes and returns some value v, then either v was
written by some WRITE or v is the initial value ⊥.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that some READ returns a value that is neither ⊥, nor written
by some WRITE. In that case, let rd be the first READ (according to the global clock) to select
such a value v at line 20, Fig. 2 at time tv (it is not difficult to see that such a rd exists). Therefore,
if any READ operation has written back a value up to tv, this value must have been ⊥, or it has
been written by some WRITE. Without loss of generality, assume that v is returned as v = c.val,
where c.ts = ts. Then, according to line 18, Fig. 2, for the timestamp value pair c, either safe(c)
or safeFrozen(c) hold, i.e., either b + 1 servers have sent a READ − ACK message containing
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c in either pw or w (safe(c)) fields, or frozen (safeFrozen(c)) field, including at least one non-
malicious server si. Note that non-malicious servers update their pw, w and frozen fields only
when they receive a PW or W message from the writer, or a writeback message (WB) from the
reader. Since until time tv no reader has sent any writeback message containing a value that is
neither ⊥ nor written by some WRITE, we conclude that c was written by some writer or it was
never updated by si, so it is ⊥. A contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 2. No ambiguity. No two non-malicious servers ever store different values with the same
timestamp.
Proof. Note that the writer never assigns different values to the same timestamp (lines 4-5, Fig. 1).
By Lemma 1, when (if) writing back a value, the readers always write back a value along with the
timestamp the writer assigned to it. Therefore, it is impossible that two non-malicious servers store
different values with the same timestamp in their pw, w, vw or frozen variables. uunionsq
Lemma 3. Non-decreasing timestamps. Non-malicious servers never replace a newer value
with an older one in their pw, w or vw fields.
Proof. Obvious from server code inspection, Figure 3. uunionsq
Lemma 4. Frozen is concurrent. If a complete READ rd returns c.val, such that c is frozen,
then c is written by some WRITE wr concurrent with rd.
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction. Suppose wr is not concurrent with rd. There are two
possibilities: (1) wr precedes rd, and (2) rd precedes wr. Without loss of generality we consider the
case where the reader rj executes rd.
Consider case (1). Note that every READ by rj has its distinct, monotonically increasing times-
tamp. Let the timestamp for rd be tsrrd. A non-malicious server changes its tsrj variable only if
it receives the READ message from rj containing a timestamp greater than tsrj (line 10, Fig. 3).
Therefore, a non-malicious server sets tsrj tp tsrrd only once rd started. In addition, the writer
“freezes” the value for tsrrd, and then sends it within some later WRITE wr to servers, only when
it receives at least b+1 server PW −ACK messages containing the pair 〈rj , tsr′′〉 in the newread
fields, where tsr′′ ≥ tsrrd and the b+ 1st highest value is tsrrd. Among these b+ 1 tsr′′ values, at
least one is from a non-malicious server. Therefore, rd must have already started when the writer
freezed the value for tsrrd. This is a contradiction with the assumption that wr precedes rd.
Consider now case (2). Note that the writer sends the 〈rj , c, read−ts[rj ]〉 (lines 6 and 21, Fig. 1)
in a frozen field of the PW message of the WRITE with a timestamp ts′ = c.ts + 1. Note also
that rd by rj returns c.val such that c is frozen only if the latest copy of the variable frozenrj of at
least b+ 1 servers contains frozenrj .pw = c and frozenrj .tsr = tsrrd, where tsrrd is a timestamp
of rd. This includes at least one non-malicious server si that updates its frozenrj variable only
upon receiving the PW message for a WRITE with a timestamp ts′. Therefore, rd has not yet
completed when a WRITE with a timestamp ts′ was invoked. Since wr that wrote c.val precedes
a WRITE with a timestamp ts′, we conclude that rd cannot precede wr. A contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 5. Locking a pw value. If a set X of at least t+ b+ 1 non-malicious servers set their
local variable pw such that pw.ts ≥ pw′.ts at time t′, then a complete READ rd invoked after t′
cannot return a value pw′′.val such that pw′′.ts < pw′.ts.
Proof. First, consider the case where pw′′ is live. Every server in X stores pw such that pw.ts ≥
pw′.ts before rd is invoked. In addition, the timestamps of pw variables at non-malicious servers
are non-decreasing (Lemma 3). The response of each server in X to rd, if any, contains pw, such
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that pw.ts ≥ pw′.ts. Since a reader in every round of READ awaits responses from S − t servers
(line 17, Fig. 2), at least b + 1 ≥ 1 servers from the set X will respond to every round of rd. Let
c be the smallest timestamp-value pair contained in the pw field of some response to rd from a
non-malicious server si, for which c.ts ≥ pw′.ts. We prove, by contradiction, that c is not invalidpw.
By definition of invalidpw, a set Y of at least S − b − t servers must have responded with values
c′ in their pw fields, such that c′.ts < c.ts ∨ (c′.ts = c.ts ∧ c′.val 6= c.val). Since X contains only
non-malicious servers and |X| ≥ t + b + 1, and as |X| + |Y | > S, X and Y intersect in at least 1
(non-malicious) servers, so at least one of the responses from Y is from the non-malicious server
sj that belongs to the set X. Therefore, pwj .ts ≥ c.ts and, thus, pwj .ts = c.ts ∧ pwj .val 6= c.val.
However, as both si and sj are non-malicious, this is impossible (Lemma 2). A contradiction.
Therefore, c where c.ts ≥ pw′.ts is not invalidpw and READ rd can not return any pw′′ such
that: (1) pw′′ is live, and (2) pw′′.ts < pw′.ts.
Now suppose that pw′′ is frozen. Let pw1.ts be the lowest timestamp of every pw.ts gepw′.ts
in X. Since non-malicious servers store only values written by some WRITE, we conclude that a
WRITE with a timestamp pw1.ts was invoked before rd. If rd returns pw′′ such that pw′′.ts <
pw′.ts ≤ pw1.ts, then a WRITE with a timestamp pw′′.ts precedes rd. This violates Lemma 4. A
contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 6. Locking a w value. If a set of X of at least t+1 non-malicious servers have set their
local variables pw and w such that pw.ts ≥ w′.ts and w.ts ≥ w′.ts at time t′, a complete READ rd
invoked after t cannot return a value w′′.val such that w′′.ts < w′.ts.
Proof. First consider the case where pw′′ is live. Every server in X stores pw and w such that
pw.ts ≥ w′.ts and w.ts ≥ w′.ts before rd is invoked. In addition, the timestamps of variables pw
and w at non-malicious servers are non-decreasing (Lemma 3), each server in X, if it responds to rd,
its response in every round will contain pw and w, such that pw.ts ≥ w′.ts and w.ts ≥ w′.ts. Since a
reader in every round of READ awaits responses from S−t servers (line 17, Fig. 2), at least 1 server
from the setX will respond to every round of rd. Let c be the smallest timestamp-value pair returned
in the pw or w field by a non-malicious server si, for which c.ts ≥ w′.ts. We prove, by contradiction,
that c is not invalidw. By definition of invalidw, a set Y of at least S−t servers must have responded
with values c′ in their pw or w fields, such that c′.ts < c.ts∨ (c′.ts = c.ts∧ c′.val 6= c.val). Since X
contains only non-malicious servers and |X| ≥ t+1, |X|+ |Y | > S, so at least one of the responses
from Y is from the non-malicious server sj that belongs to the set X. Therefore, pwj .ts ≥ c.ts and
wj .ts ≥ c.ts and, thus, pwj .ts = c.ts∧ pwj .val 6= c.val or wj .ts = c.ts∧wj .val 6= c.val. However, as
both si and sj are non-malicious, this is impossible (Lemma 2). A contradiction.
Therefore, c where c.ts ≥ w′.ts is not invalidpw and READ rd cannot return any w′′ such that:
(1) w′′ is live, and (2) w′′.ts < w′.ts.
Now suppose that pw′′ is frozen. Let w1.ts be the lowest timestamp of every w.ts gew′.ts in X.
Since non-malicious servers only store values written by some WRITE, we conclude that a WRITE
with a timestamp w1.ts was invoked before rd. If rd returns w′′ such that w′′.ts < w′.ts ≤ w1.ts,
then a WRITE with a timestamp w′′.ts precedes rd. This violates Lemma 4. A contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 7. Atomicity of READ with respect to WRITEs. If a READ rd is complete and it
succeeds some complete wr =WRITE(v), then rd does not return a value older than v.
Proof. First note that the timestamps monotonically increase at the writer and all the values
that any reader returns (and, hence, all the values that it writes back) are written by the writer.
Therefore, timestamps associated to the values by the writer in line 4, Fig 1, order the values
that readers return. Now we show that rd does not return c.val, such that c.ts < ts, where ts is
associated to v in line 4, Fig 1 of WRITE(v) = wr. We consider two cases: (1) c is live and (2) c
is frozen.
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1. safe(c) ∧ highCand(c) (c is live). First, suppose that wr is a fast WRITE. Then, 〈ts, v〉 is
written to pw fields of at least S − fw servers, out of which a set X, of size at least S − fw − b
are non-malicious. Since fw ≤ t− b, we obtain S − fw − b ≥ S − t = t+ b+1, and we can apply
Lemma 5 (pw′.ts being ts), and conclude that rd does not return a value with a timestamp less
than ts, i.e., older than v.
Now, let wr be a WRITE that completed in two phases. Then, 〈ts, v〉 is written to pw, w and
vw fields of at least S−t = t+b+1 servers, out of which a set X, of size at least S−t−b = t+1,
contains only non-malicious servers. We can apply Lemma 6 (w′.ts being ts), and conclude that
rd does not return a value with a timestamp less than ts, i.e., older than v. Therefore, no c′
such that c′.ts < ts can satisfy the highCand predicate, and no such c can be returned as live.
A contradiction.
2. safeFrozen(c) (c is frozen). Due to lemma 4, c has been written by someWRITE wr′ concurrent
with rd. Since (1) the writer assigns non-decreasing timestamps to values, (2) wr precedes rd
and (3) rd is concurrent with wr′, we conclude that wr precedes wr′ and c.ts > ts. uunionsq
Lemma 8. READ hierarchy. If a READ rd is complete and it succeeds some complete READ
rd′ that returns v′, then rd does not return a value older than v′.
Proof. Note that a complete READ rd does not write back a value c.val it returns if rd is fast, i.e.,
if rd selects c at line 20, Fig. 2 at the end of first round (rnd = 1), and if fast(c) holds (i.e., if either
fastpw(c) or fastvw(c) hold). We now show that rd does not return c.val, such that c.ts < ts′,
where ts′ is associated to v′ in line 4, Fig. 1 of the WRITE that wrote v′. We consider two cases:
the first where rd′ is fast and the second in which rd′ is slow and writesback c′ = 〈ts′, v′〉 (lines
26-28, Fig. 2).
1. rd′ is fast. First we consider the case where fastpw(c′) holds and then the one in which
fastvw(c′) holds in rd′.
a. fastpw(c′) holds in rd′. In this case, in rd′ a reader has received at least t+2b+1 different
server responses that contain c′ in their pw fields. Out of these, a set X of at least t + b + 1
servers are non-malicious. Applying Lemma 5, we conclude that rd returns a value c.val such
that c.ts ≥ c′.ts.
b. fastvw(c′) holds in rd′. In this case, in rd′ a reader has received at least b + 1 different
server responses that contain c′ in their w fields. This includes at least one non-malicious server
si. According to the server code, non-malicious servers modify their vw fields to c′ only when
they receiveW orWB message with a round = 3 (line 15, Fig. 3) from the writer or the reader.
In any case, a set X of at least t + 1 non-malicious servers have already all set their pw and
w variables to c′ when receiving a W or WB message with round = 2. Hence, we can apply
Lemma 6, and conclude that rd does not return a value with a timestamp less than c′.ts, i.e.,
older than c′.val.
2. rd′ writesback the value. In this case, in rd′ the reader has completed writing back the value
c′.val and a set X of at least t+ 1 are non-malicious have all set their pw, w and vw variables
to c′ at latest during rd′, i.e., before rd is invoked. Hence, we can apply Lemma 6, and conclude
that rd does not return a value with a timestamp less than c′.ts, i.e., older than c′.val. uunionsq
Theorem 1. Atomicity. The algorithm in Figures 1, 2 and 3 is atomic.
Proof. By Lemmas 1, 7 and 8. uunionsq
We proceed by proving the wait-freedom property.
Theorem 2. (Wait-freedom.) The algorithm in Figures 1, 2 and 3 is wait-free.
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Proof. The argument for the wait-freedom of a WRITE operation is based on the assumption that
there are at most t faulty servers. In every round of a WRITE, the writer waits for at most S − t
valid server responses that the writer is guaranteed to receive eventually. The timer that the writer
awaits in line 8, Figure 1, eventually expires and the operation eventually completes.
The argument for the wait-freedom of a READ operation is slightly more involved. We prove
that in every run in which at most t servers fail (out of which at most b are malicious), every READ
operation rd invoked by the correct reader completes.
We distinguish two cases: (a) the case where the writer issues a finite number of WRITE
operations in the run, and (b) the case where there is an infinite (unbounded) number of WRITE
operations in the run.
Case (a) - Finite number of WRITES. In this case, since no READ returns (nor writes back) any
value not written by some READ there is a WRITE operation with the highest timestamp. Let wr
denote the last complete WRITE operation that writes v with timestamp ts (or v = v0, ts = ⊥ if
there is none. We denote with wr′ a possible later (incomplete) WRITE that writes v′ with ts′.
Assume, by contradiction, that READ rd never returns a value. Then, rd invokes rounds on all
correct servers, sending 〈READ〉 messages infinitely many times. We distinguish two cases: (a.1)
value v′ is never pre-written (written in the pw fields) into more than b correct servers and (a.2)
there is a time t at which wr′ is pre-written into b+ 1 or more correct servers.
In case (a.1) let t be the time at which last correct server changed its pw to 〈ts′, v′〉 (by wr′
or an incomplete writeback that sends a WB message with a same timestamp-value pair). In both
cases, let t′ > t be the time at which rd received at least one response from every correct server
sent after t.
Consider case (a.1). First we prove that 〈ts, v〉 is safe. There are two cases: (a.1.i) first in which
wr is fast, and (a.1.ii) second, in which wr is slow.
(i) Consider the case where wr is a fast WRITE. Since 〈ts, v〉 was written to pw fields of at least
S−fw servers, out of which at least S−fw−t ≥ 2b+1 are correct. Since c′ = 〈ts′, w′〉 is pre-written
in the pw field of at most b of these correct servers, from time t′ onward, 〈ts, v〉 appears at least
b+ 1 times in pw[∗] or w[∗] and is safe.
(ii) Now, assume that wr is not a fast WRITE. Since 〈ts, v〉 was written to vw and w fields of at
least S − t servers, out of which at least S − 2t ≥ b+ 1 are correct. Out of these, no vw or w field
ever changes its value (as this would require that c′ is pre-written in at least b+1 correct servers).
Hence, from time t′ onward, 〈ts, v〉 appears at least b+ 1 times in w[∗] and is safe.
Moreover, there are at least S − t responses in w[∗], from correct servers, with either 〈ts, v〉
or with a timestamp smaller than ts. Therefore, every timestamp-value pair c, such that c.ts >
ts ∨ (c.ts = ts ∧ c.val 6= v) is invalidw. Finally, there are at least S − t− b responses from correct
servers in pw[∗] with either 〈ts, v〉 or with a timestamp smaller than ts. Therefore, every timestamp-
value pair c, such that c.ts > ts ∨ (c.ts = ts ∧ c.val 6= v) is invalidpw. Thus, at the next iteration,
highCand(〈ts, v〉) and safe(〈ts, v〉) hold, 〈ts, v〉 ∈ C and rd returns, a contradiction.
Now consider case (a.2), where v′ is pre-written (by a WRITE or some READ) into b + 1 or
more correct servers. Then, after t′, 〈ts′, v′〉 appears at least b + 1 times in pw[∗] and is safe. It is
not difficult to see, as no subsequent valid value is present in the system, such that for every pair
c′′ such that c′′.ts > c′.ts ∨ (c′′.ts = c′.ts ∧ c′′.val 6= c′.val) invalidw(c′′) and invalidpw(c′′) holds.
Thus in the next iteration, 〈ts′, v′〉 ∈ C and READ returns: a contradiction.
Case (b) - Infinite number of WRITES. Suppose, by contradiction, that rd never completes. Let
tsrj be the timestamp of rd (at the correct reader rj). Note that the reader rj never invokes a
READ rd′ with a timestamp tsr′j > tsrj , and therefore, the writer cannot freeze a value (for the
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reader rj) for a READ with a higher timestamp than tsrj). Since rd invokes an infinite number of
rounds (rounds do not block as in every round the reader awaits S − t responses), eventually, the
reader will write tsrj to every correct server. Since there are S − t = t + b + 1 correct servers, in
the next WRITE round (as there is an infinite number of WRITES, the writer executes an infinite
number of WRITE rounds), the writer reads tsrj from at least b + 1 of these servers, and will
freeze the current pw value (pw′) for the reader rj (it is not difficult to see that, for a particular
tsrj , the writer freezes at most one value). Since the channels are reliable and the servers take
into account frozen fields of the old PW messages of the writer, eventually, every correct server
stores frozenrj = 〈pw′, tsrj〉. Since there are S − t = t+ b+ 1 correct servers, in the next READ
iteration, rj reads the same frozenrj = 〈pw′, tsrj〉 from at least b+ 1 correct servers, pw′ becomes
safeFrozen and rd terminates. A contradiction. uunionsq
Now we prove that our algorithm implements fast WRITES and fast READS. If at most fw
servers are faulty, every synchronous WRITE is fast. Moreover, if at most fr servers are faulty,
every lucky READ (i.e., the READ that is synchronous and contention-free) is fast.
Theorem 3. (Fast WRITES.) In the algorithm of Figures 1, 2 and 3, if a complete WRITE is
synchronous and at most fw servers fail by the completion of wr, then wr is fast.
Proof. As at most fw servers are faulty and the WRITE is synchronous, the writer receives the
response from at least S − fw servers in the PW round before the timer Timeout expires (line 8,
Fig. 1) and the WRITE completes in a single round-trip, before the second, W phase. uunionsq
Theorem 4. (Fast READS.) In the algorithm of Figures 1, 2 and 3, if a complete READ oper-
ation rd is synchronous and contention-free (i.e., if rd is lucky) and at most fr servers fail by the
completion of rd, then rd is fast.
Proof. First, suppose that the last (complete) WRITE (wr) that precedes rd writes a timestamp-
value pair cpw. As rd is contention free, no other WRITE is invoked before the completion of rd,
and, hence, no other value stored by a correct server has a timestamp higher than cpw.ts during
the execution of rd.
First, suppose that wr is a fast WRITE. Thus, cpw was written in the pw field of at least
S − fw = 2b + t + fr + 1 servers out of which at least S − fw − fr = 2b + t + 1 are correct and
respond with a valid READ − ACK message in the first round of rd. Therefore, at the end of
round 1, safe(cpw) and fastpw(cpw) (line 5, Fig. 2) hold. Let c′ be any timestamp-value pair such
that ∃i, readLive(c′, i), c′.ts ≥ cpw.ts ∨ (c′.ts = cpw.ts ∧ c′.val 6= cpw.val). Then, as there are no
WRITES after wr that are concurrent with rd, and as the system is synchronous, all S−fr ≥ S− t
correct servers respond before the expiration of the timer (and, thus, round 1) with timestamps less
than c′.ts or with a timestamp c′.val = cpw.ts and a value cpw.val 6= c′.val. Therefore, at the end
of round 1, for every such timestamp-value pair c′, the predicates invalidw(c′) and invalidpw(c′)
hold. Finally, predicate highCand(cpw) is true at the end of round 1 and predicate fastpw(c) holds
and rd returns cpw.val.
Now suppose that wr is a two-phase WRITE. Hence, cpw was written in the pw, w and vw
fields of at least S− t = b+ t+1 servers out of which at least S− t−fr ≥ S−2t = b+1 are correct
and respond with a valid READ − ACK message in the first round of rd. Therefore, at the end
of round 1, safe(cpw) and fastvw(cpw) (line 6, Fig. 2) hold. Let c′ be any timestamp-value pair
such that ∃i, readLive(c′, i), c′.ts ≥ cpw.ts∨ (c′.ts = cpw.ts∧c′.val 6= cpw.val). Then, as there are no
WRITES after wr that are concurrent with rd, and as the system is synchronous, all S−fr ≥ S− t
correct servers respond before the expiration of the timer (and, thus, round 1) with timestamps less
than c′.ts or with a timestamp c′.val = cpw.ts and a value cpw.val 6= c′.val. Therefore, at the end
of round 1, for every such a timestamp-value pair c′, the predicates invalidw(c′) and invalidpw(c′)
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hold. Finally, predicate highCand(cpw) is true at the end of round 1 and predicate fastvw(cpw)
holds and rd returns cpw.val. uunionsq
4 Upper Bound
Our upper bound fw + fr ≤ t − b limits the number of actual server failures that fast lucky
read/write operations can tolerate, in any optimally resilient atomic storage implementation. In
short, the principle lying behind this bound is that the system is asynchronous in general and since
malicious servers may change their state to an arbitrary one, they can impose on readers a value
that was never written, in case the fast operations skip too many servers. In the following, we first
precisely state our upper bound and then proceed by proving it.
Proposition 2. Let I be any optimally resilient implementation of a SWMR atomic wait-free
storage, with the following properties: (1) in any partial run in which at most fw servers fail, every
lucky WRITE operation is fast, and (2) in any partial run in which at most fr servers fail, every
lucky READ operation is fast. Then, fw + fr ≤ t− b.
Proof. Let I be any implementation that satisfies properties (1) and (2) of Proposition 2, such
that fw + fr > t − b. First, we prove the case where b > 0. Since I uses 2t + b + 1 servers we can
divide the set of servers into five distinct sets: B1 that contains at least one and at most b servers,
B2 (resp., T1) that contains at most b (resp., t) servers, and Fr (resp., Fw) that contains exactly
fr ≤ t4 (resp., fw ≤ t) servers. Without loss of generality, assume that each of these sets contains
only one server. If a set has more than one server, we simply modify the runs in a way that all
processes inside a set receive the same set of messages, and if they fail, they fail at the same time,
in the same way; the proof also holds if any of the sets B2, T1, Fr and Fw are empty, as long as
|Fw|+ |Fr| > t− b.
The key runs that we use in our proof are sketched in Figure 4, to help follow the proof. Note
that, depending on the implementation I, correct servers are allowed to exchange arbitrary number
of messages after sending the replies to the first round message of the fast operation to a client.
For clarity, these messages are not depicted in Figure 4. Bolded arrows in Figure 4 depict multiple
messages exchanged between processes during the particular (slow) operation.
Let r1 be the run in which all servers are correct except Fw, which fails by crashing at the
beginning of the run. Furthermore, let wr1 be the lucky WRITE operation invoked by the correct
writer in r1 to write a value v1 6= ⊥ (where ⊥ is the initial value of the storage) in the storage and
no other operation is invoked in r1. By our assumption on I, wr1 completes in tr1, say at time t1,
and, moreover, wr1 is fast. According to the proposition, wr1 completes after receiving responses
to the first message sent to correct servers (B1, B2, T1 and Fr). Note that the messages that the
writer sends to servers during the first round of wr1 must not contain authenticated data. In r1,
depending on the implementation I correct servers are allowed to exchange arbitrary number of
messages after sending the replies to the writer. We denote the set of messages servers exchange
among themselves executing some operation op as Xop.
Let r′1 be the partial run that ends at t1, such that r′1 is identical to r1 up to time t1, except
that in r′1: (1) server Fw does not fail, but, due to asynchrony, all messages exchanged during wr1
between Fw and the writer remain in transit, and (2) all messages from Xwr1 remain in transit.
Since the writer cannot distinguish r1 from r′1, wr1 completes in r′1 at time t1.
Let r2 be the partial run that extends partial run r′1 such that: (1) Fr fails by crashing at t1,
(2) rd1 is a lucky READ operation invoked by the correct reader reader1 after t1, (3) rd1 is fast
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Fig. 4. Illustration of the upper bound proof of Proposition 2
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and completes at time t25, (4) no additional operation is invoked in r2, (5) r2 ends at t2, (6) all
messages that were in transit in r′1 remain in transit in r2.
Let r′2 be the partial run, identical to r2, except that in r′2: (1) server Fr does not fail, but, due
to asynchrony, all messages exchanged during rd1 between Fr and the reader1 remain in transit,
and (2) all the messages from Xrd1 are in transit in r
′
2. Since the reader1 and all servers, except Fr,
cannot distinguish r2 from r′2, rd1 completes in r′2 at time t2 (note that, both in r2 and r′2, reader1
and all other servers do not receive any message from Fr).
Let r′′2 be the partial run, identical to r′2, except that in r′′2 : (1) the writer fails during wr1 and
its messages are never delivered to Fr. Since reader1 and all servers, except Fr, cannot distinguish
r′2 from r′′2 , rd1 completes in r′2 at time t2 (note that, both in r′2 and r′′2 , reader1 and all other
servers do not receive any message from Fr).
Consider now a partial run r3, slightly different from r′′2 , in which the writer (resp., reader1)
fails during wr1 (resp., rd1) such that the messages sent by the writer (resp., reader1) in wr1 (resp.,
rd1) are delivered only to B1 (resp., B1 and Fw) - other servers do not receive any message from
the writer (resp., reader1). We refer to the state of B1 right after the reception of the message from
the writer as to σ1. In r3, T1 crashes at the beginning of the partial run. Assume that the writer
fails at time tfailw and that reader1 fails at time tfailr > tfailw . In r3, by the time tfailr , servers B2
and Fr did not send nor receive any message. Let rd2 be a READ operation invoked by the correct
reader reader2 at time t′3 > max(tfailr , t2). Since the only faulty server in r3 is T1, rd2 eventually
completes, possibly after the messages in Xwr1 and Xrd1 are delivered. Assume rd2 completes at
time t3 and returns vR.
Let r4 be the partial run, identical to r′′2 , except that in r4: (1) a READ operation rd2 is
invoked by the correct reader reader2 at t′3 (as in r3), (2) due to asynchrony all messages sent
by T1 to reader2 and other servers are delayed until after t3 and (3) at the beginning of r4, B2
fails maliciously: B2 plays according to the protocol with respect to the writer and reader1, but
to all other servers and reader2, B2 plays like it never received any message from the writer or
reader1; otherwise, B2 respects the protocol. Note that reader2 and the servers Fw, Fr and B1
cannot distinguish r4 from r3 and, hence, rd2 terminates in r4 at time t3 (as in r3) and returns vR.
On the other hand, reader1 cannot distinguish r4 from r′′2 and, hence, rd1 is fast and returns v1.
By atomicity, as rd1 precedes rd2, vR must equal v1.
Consider now partial run r5, identical to r3, except that in r5: (1) wr1 is never invoked, (2)
B1 fails maliciously at the beginning of r5 and forges its state to σ1; otherwise, B1 sends the same
messages as in r3, and (3) T1 is not faulty in r5, but, due to asynchrony, all messages sent by T1 to
reader2 and the other servers are delayed until after t3. The reader reader2 and the servers Fw, Fr
and B2 cannot distinguish r5 from r3, so rd2 completes at time t3 and returns vR, i.e., v1. However,
by atomicity, in r5 rd2 must return ⊥. Since v1 6= ⊥, r5 violates atomicity.
Consider now the case where b = 0. We can divide the set of servers into three distinct sets:
T1 that contains at most t servers and Fr (resp., Fw) that contains exactly fr (resp., fw servers).
Consider the partial runs r1a to r5a obtained by modifying the (partial) runs r1 to r5, respectively,
in such a way that all steps by the servers B1 and B2 are erased. It is not difficult to see, that
reader2 cannot distinguish r5a from r4a and r3a. By atomicity property, in r4a reader2 must return
v1 as the preceding fast READ rd1 has returned v1. Therefore, in r5a rd2 returns v1 a value that
was never written, violating atomicity. uunionsq






Our tight bound on the best-case complexity of an atomic storage raises several questions, which
we discuss below.
Tolerating malicious readers. While it is pretty obvious that a malicious writer can always corrupt
the storage, it is appealing to figure out whether it is feasible to tolerate malicious readers.
The problem is basically the following: consider a complete write followed by a read from a
malicious reader that writes back the value to the servers, which itself is followed by a read from a
correct reader. Our algorithm does not ensure that the malicious reader will not write back a value
that was never written by the writer. Hence, a correct reader might return the value written back
by the malicious reader instead of the last written value (thus violating atomicity).
In fact, we are not aware of any optimally resilient atomic implementation that tolerates mali-
cious readers without using data authentication or intercommunication among servers. It would be
interesting to devise an algorithm that allows fast lucky operations and tolerates malicious readers,
in a model where server intercommunication is possible.
Authentication. Our upper bound fw+fr ≤ t−b of Section 4 is based on the possibility for malicious
servers to get to an arbitrary state. If we relax the guarantees of an atomic storage, and accept
violations of atomicity with a very small probability, we could benefit from data authentication
primitives, such as digital signatures [22] or message authentication codes (MACs). Roughly speak-
ing, this would prevent malicious servers from impersonating the writer (run r5, Section 4), and
hence circumvent our upper bound. However, since the generation of digital signatures is (computa-
tionally) expensive, it may impair the benefits of expediting operations in a single communication
round (besides, malicious servers would have to be assumed computationally bounded).
On the other hand, (computationally less expensive [7]) MACs might appear to circumvent
our upper bound: since clients are non-malicious, they could share a symmetric key (unknown to
servers) to prevent malicious servers from forging values (with a very high probability). However,
our upper bound requires every lucky operation to be fast (provided at most fw/fr server failures):
it is not clear how clients can distribute the secret key while preserving this requirement (recall that
any number of clients can fail, and hence clients would have to establish the key through servers).
Moreover, MACs are not suitable for solving the malicious readers issue, since in this case, roughly,
computational overhead of MACs grows proportionally to the number of readers. In the following,
we discuss an alternative approach to boosting thresholds fw and fr, without relying on any data
authentication.
Trading (few) reads. Our upper bound proof of fw + fr ≤ t − b heavily relies on the fact that
we require every lucky operation (in particular, every lucky read operation) to be fast. In fact, if
we allow a certain number, yet just a small fraction, of lucky read operations to be slow, we can
drastically increase the sum of the thresholds fw and fr: fw ≤ t− b and fr ≤ t. First we define the
notions of sequence of consecutive lucky operations.
Definition 1. Sequence. Consider n lucky READ operations rdi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If, for every i such
that 2 ≤ i ≤ n, rdi−1 precedes rdi, we say that the ordered set {rd1, . . . rdn} is a sequence of lucky
READ operations of length n.
Definition 2. Consecutive. Consider the sequence Sn = {rd1, . . . rdn} of lucky READ opera-
tions of length n. If no WRITE operation is invoked in the time period [trd1inv , trdnresp ], where rd1
is invoked at trd1inv and rdn completes at trdnresp, we say that Sn is a sequence of consecutive lucky
READ operations of length n.
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Basically, our very same atomic implementation of Section 3 ensures that: (1) every lucky write
is fast given that at most fw = t − b servers are faulty, and (2) in any sequence of n (0 < n <∝)
consecutive lucky reads, there is at most one slow lucky read (regardless of the number of server
failures, i.e., fr = t). More details can be found in Appendix A.
These bounds (fw ≤ t−b and fr ≤ t) are also tight in the following sense. No optimally resilient
safe storage algorithm can have every lucky write be fast despite the failure of fw > t− b servers.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Trading writes. It is also natural to ask if our upper bound can be circumvented for the lucky
reads, if we are willing to trade certain, or even all writes. In fact it is easy to modify our algorithm
such that writes are slow (by removing line 8, Fig. 1) and ensure that every lucky read is fast (i.e.,
fr = t).
An inherent price of lucky reads. Recall that, in our algorithm, servers send messages only in
response to clients’ messages, i.e., servers do not exchange messages with other servers, nor they
send unsolicited messages. In such data-centric model, the notion of the number of communication-
rounds per operation effectively captures the latency of distributed operations [1, 13].
In our algorithm, unlucky writes execute in three communication round-trips. In this sense, our
algorithm does not degrade gracefully, since an atomic storage implementation can be optimally
resilient with two communication-round trips for every write. However, in Appendix C, we show
that the three communication round-trips worst-case complexity of the write operation is in fact
inherent to data-centric, optimally resilient algorithms that do not use authentication to tolerate
malicious server failures (b > 0), and that enable every lucky read to be fast despite the failure of
at least one server (which is precisely the case with our algorithm, if fr > 0).
More specifically, in Appendix C, we show that for any data-centric algorithm that enables
every lucky read to be fast despite the failure of fr servers, a write operation can be implemented
in (at most) two communication-rounds if and only if the total number of servers S is at least
S ≥ 2t+ b+min(b, fr) + 1. Consequently, since our algorithm is optimally resilient (i.e., it makes
use of exactly Sopt = 2t + b + 1 servers), and allows fast lucky reads despite the failure of fr > 0
servers (in the general case where b 6= t, and fw 6= t − b, since fr is bounded by t − b − fw), our
algorithm cannot have the worst-case complexity of write operation of only two communication
round-trips. Therefore, the third communication round-trip is inherent for the write operation in
our case.
Regularity vs Atomicity. The problem of malicious readers can easily be solved by weakening the
guarantees of the storage implementation. Namely, our algorithm can easily be modified such that:
(1) it tolerates malicious readers and (2) the number of actual server failures that every lucky
write (resp., read) operation tolerate, fw (resp., fr), is t − b (resp., t). This can be achieved by
simple modifications of our algorithm, most notably by removing the writeback procedure in the
read implementation. The key idea in achieving optimally resilient wait-free implementation while
tolerating malicious readers is to allow readers to modify the state of servers without impacting
other readers (by using our freezing mechanism). The price for these improvements is to trade
atomicity for regularity. We show hot to modify our atomic implementation to obtain a regular one
in Appendix D.
Multiple writers. It is not clear whether it is possible to have a multi-writer multi-reader (MWMR)
implementation where certain write operations may be fast (i.e., complete in a single round-trip
without using data authentication) in some runs. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing
MWMR implementations implements fast write operations under any conditions.
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Contending with the ghost. If the writer fails without completing a write wr, every subsequent read
operation rd is, according to our definition, considered under contention. Therefore, no rd is lucky
and no rd is guaranteed to be fast. Interestingly, in our algorithm, at most three synchronous read
operations by some reader rj , invoked after the failure of the writer, need to be slow. Hence, our
algorithm quickly overcomes the issues of the writer failure and restores its optimal performance.
More details can be found in Appendix E.
6 Related Work
The area of robust shared storage over unreliable components is not new. Original work considered
tolerating crash failures of the servers [2]. More recent work considered tolerating arbitrary [16,18]
server failures. We recall here several results about such implementations that are close to ours. We
discuss the implementations that do not use data authentication and implement fast read/write
operations, and we compare those to our algorithm. For an accurate comparison of algorithm
performance, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume a SWMR setting.
In [21], Martin et al. proved that no safe [17]6 storage implementation is possible if the available
number of servers is S ≤ 3t, considering the case where b = t. When b 6= t, it is not difficult to
extend [21] and show that any safe storage implementation requires at least 2t + b + 1 servers,
establishing an optimal resilience lower bound for any storage implementation in an asynchronous
system. Furthermore, Martin et al. presented in [21] a MWMR optimally resilient atomic storage
implementation, called SBQ-L, that uses 3t + 1 servers to tolerate b = t arbitrary server failures
without using data authentication, that is not wait-free. In contrast, we present a wait-free optimally
resilient implementation that enables fast reads and fast writes under best-case conditions without
using data authentication.
The relationship between resilience and fast operations, in the case where b = t, was analyzed
by Abraham et al. in [1]. They showed that, in order for every write operation to be fast, at least
4t+1 servers (actually based shared objects) are required even for the case of a single-writer-single-
reader (SWSR) safe storage. Furthermore, they used 3t + 1 passive discs to implement a SWMR
wait-free safe and a FW-terminating7 regular implementations without using data authentication.
In their algorithms, writes are never fast, but every contention-free and synchronous (i.e., lucky)
read operation is fast despite the actual failure of t shared discs. In contrast, we provide stronger,
atomic wait-free, semantics and achieve fast synchronous writes, in addition to achieving fast lucky
reads. To achieve this, besides using some novel techniques (e.g., the “freezing” mechanism as well
as the fast writing), our algorithm makes use of some techniques established by [1].
In [12], Goodson et al. described an implementation of a wait-free MWMR atomic storage,
assuming 2t + 2b + 1 servers (thus not being optimally resilient). In [12], lucky reads are fast,
in the case there are no server failures fr = 0. In our SWMR setting, this implementation can
trivially be modified to allow every write operation to be fast. The wait-freedom of the atomic
storage of [12] relies on the fact that servers store the entire history of the shared data structure,
which is not the case with our algorithm. Moreover, our implementation is optimally resilient
and achieves fast lucky read/write operations while maximizing the number of server failures that
fast atomic operations can tolerate in optimally resilient implementations. The algorithm of [12]
tolerates poisonous writes [21] performed by malicious clients to write inconsistent data into servers,
but does not solve the issue of malicious readers that we pointed out in Section 5. The algorithm
of [12] uses erasure coding in which servers store data fragments, instead of full replication, to
improve bandwidth consumption and storage requirements. Our algorithm can easily be modified
to support erasure coding, along the lines of [8, 12].
6 Roughly, in a safe storage, a read must return the last value written, or any value if it is concurrent with a write.
7 Roughly, FW-termination requires only that read operations terminate when a finite number of writes are invoked.
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In [5], Bazzi and Ding presented a MWMR atomic implementation that used 4t+1 servers (b = t
case), and that can trivially be modified, in the SWMR setting, to achieve fast writes whenever
there is no concurrency. However, in [5] reads are never fast and the implementation is not wait-
free.8 Bazzi and Ding also suggested in [6], an improved, wait-free, version of their algorithm, that
still uses 4t + 1 servers, and ensures fast writes when there is no contention; fast reads are not
considered.
In [11], Dutta et al. considered atomic storage implementations that implement fast operations
(even in unlucky situations). They derived a tight resilience bound that limits the number of
readers that can be supported by such an implementation. Namely, to support R readers, any such
emulation must make use of at least (R+2)t+(R+1)b+1 servers. The implementation presented
in [11] uses data authentication and is clearly not optimally resilient. In this paper, we focus only
on optimally resilient implementations that (1) support any number of readers, (2) do not use data
authentication and (3) are optimized for lucky operations.
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A Trading (few) READS
In this Appendix, we prove that our atomic storage implementation of Section 3 satisfies the
following proposition:
Proposition 3. There is an optimally resilient implementation I of a SWMR robust atomic storage,
such that:
– in any partial run r in which at most t− b servers fail, every lucky WRITE operation is fast,
– in any partial run r, for any n, 0 < n <∝, in any sequence Sn of consecutive lucky READ
operations of length n, there is at most one slow lucky READ operation rd′ ∈ Sn.
Note that, in Proposition 3, the sum fw + fr must no longer equal t − b (as is the case in
Proposition 1, Section 3), but rather: (1) fw equals t− b, and (2) implicitly, fr = t.
It can be seen that, when we substitute fw = t− b and fr = t, all lemmas and theorems of the
correctness proof of Section 3.4 still hold, except Theorem 12 (Fast READS).
Therefore, it is left to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. (Case fr = t: almost all lucky READS are fast.) In the algorithm of Fig-
ures 1, 2 and 3, in any partial run r, for any n, 0 < n <∝, in any sequence Sn of consecutive lucky
READ operations of length n, there is at most one slow lucky READ operation rd′ ∈ Sn.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is a partial run r′ and a sequence Sk of consecutive
lucky READ operations of length k (k ≥ 2), such that there are two lucky READ operations
rd′, rd′′ ∈ Sk, such that both rd′ and rd′′ are slow. Without loss of generality, assume rd′ precedes
rd′′ in r′.
As rd′ and rd′′ are lucky, there is no WRITE operation concurrent with either rd′ or rd′′. Let v
be the value written by the last complete WRITE wr that precedes rd′ (or v = ⊥ if there is no such
a WRITE) and let ts be the timestamp associated to v by the writer in line 4, Figure 1 (or ts = ts0,
if v = ⊥). By atomicity, rd′ returns v. By our assumption on rd′, rd′ is slow and, therefore, rd′
writesback 〈v, ts〉 before it completes. Since rd′′ succeeds rd′, by the time rd′′ is invoked, at least
b + 1 correct servers set their pw, w and vw variables to 〈v, ts〉. Therefore, at the end of the first
round of rd′′, safe(〈v, ts〉) and fastvw(〈v, ts〉) hold. Moreover, as no WRITE operation is invoked
after wr before rd′′ completes (rd′ and rd′′ belong to the sequence of consecutive lucky READ
operations, and wr is the last WRITE that precedes rd′, that, in turn, precedes rd′′), no correct
server ever stores in its pw, w or vw fields a value with a higher timestamp than ts. Since rd′′ is
lucky, all correct servers respond in the first round of rd′′. Therefore, it is not difficult to see that,
for any c′ such that ∃i, readLive(c′, i), c′.ts ≥ ts ∨ (c′.ts = ts ∧ c′.val 6= v), predicates invalidw(c′)
and invalidpw(c′) also hold. Therefore, at the end of the first round of rd′′ highCand(〈v, ts〉) holds
and rd′′ returns v at the end of the first round, i.e., rd′′ is fast. A contradiction. uunionsq
A.1 Remarks
Note that our algorithm minimizes the number of lucky READ operations that may be slow when
fw = t− b, fr = t, in the sense that in any sequence of consecutive READ operations at most one
lucky READ operation may be slow. Indeed, if we would require an algorithm such that in any
sequence of consecutive READ operations all READS operations be fast, such an algorithm would
be subject to our upper bound result fw + fr ≤ t− b of Section 4.
Finally, it can be shown that in our algorithm, once more than t− b servers fail in a partial run
r, at time T , and at least one WRITE wr invoked after T completes, every lucky READ operation
that succeeds wr is fast (despite the possible failure of fr = t servers). This is the case because
no WRITE invoked after T will be fast. Roughly, the price of a single slow READ per sequence
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of consecutive lucky READS (in case fr = t) is paid in order to have fast WRITES (in case that
at most t − b servers fail). In a sense, this single slow READ in a sequence of consecutive lucky
READS can be seen as the one that “finishes” the fast WRITE.
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B Upper Bound on Fast Writes
In this Appendix, we show that no optimally resilient safe storage implementation can have every
lucky WRITE operation be fast despite the failure of more than t− b servers.
Proposition 4. If I is an optimally resilient implementation of a SWSR robust safe storage such
that: in every partial run r in which at most fw servers fail, every lucky WRITE operation wr is
fast, then fw ≤ t− b
The proof of Proposition 4 is obtained by simplifying our proof of Proposition 2, Section 4. The
simplifications are the following: (1) the size of the set Fr is fixed to 0, (2) in all partial runs we
remove any step of the reader1 and (3) we reduce the number of partial runs used in the proof.
Such a simplified proof is similar to the proof of [1] with the following differences: (a) our proof
considers optimally resilient implementations and (b) our proof distinguishes resilience thresholds
b and t. In the following, we first define a SWSR robust safe storage and then we give the complete
proof of Proposition 4.
An algorithm implements a robust safe storage if every run of the algorithm satisfies wait-
freedom and safeness properties. Here we give a definition of safeness for a SWSR safe storage.
In the single-writer setting, the writes in a run have a natural ordering which corresponds to
their physical order. Denote by wrk the kth WRITE in a run (k ≥ 1), and by valk the value written
by the kth WRITE. Let val0 = ⊥. We say that a partial run satisfies safeness if the following
property holds: if a READ rd is contention-free and it succeeds some WRITE wrk (k ≥ 1), then
rd returns vall such that l ≥ k.
We proceed by proving Proposition 4.
Proof. Let I be the implementation that satisfies properties (1) and (2) of Proposition 4, such
that fw > t− b. Since in our model at most t servers fail in any run, we assume fw ≤ t. Hence, we
discuss only the case where b > 0. Since I uses 2t + b + 1 servers we can divide the set of servers
into five distinct sets: B1 that contains at least one server and at most b servers, B2 (resp., T1)
that contains at most b (resp., t) servers, and Fw that contains exactly fw servers. Without loss
of generality assume that each of these sets contains only one server. If a set has more than one
server, we simply modify the runs in a way that all processes inside a set receive the same set of
messages, and if they fail, they fail at the same time, in the same way; the proof also holds if any
of the sets B2, T1, are empty.
Let r1 be the run in which all servers are correct except Fw, which fails by crashing at the
beginning of the run. Furthermore, let wr1 be the lucky WRITE operation invoked by the correct
writer in r1 to write a value v1 6= ⊥ (where ⊥ is the initial value of the storage) in the storage
and no other operation is invoked in r1. By our assumption on I, wr1 completes in tr1, say at time
t1, and, moreover, wr1 is fast. According to the proposition, wr1 terminates after accessing every
correct server (B1, B2 and T1) at most once. Hence, wr1 completes after receiving responses to the
first message sent to correct servers (B1, B2 and T1). Note that the messages that the writer sends
to servers during the first round of wr1 must not contain authenticated data. In r1, depending on
the implementation I correct servers are allowed to exchange arbitrary number of messages after
sending the replies to the writer. We denote the set of messages servers exchange among themselves
while executing some operation op as Xop.
Let r′1 be the partial run that ends at t1, such that r′1 is identical to r1 up to time t1, except
that in r′1: (1) server Fw does not fail, but, due to asynchrony, all messages exchanged during wr1
between Fw and the writer remain in transit, and (2) all messages from Xwr1 remain in transit.
Since the writer cannot distinguish r1 from r′1, wr1 completes in r′1 at time t1.
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Now consider a partial run r2 slightly different from r′1 in which the writer fails during wr1 such
that the messages sent by the writer in wr1 are delivered only to B1 - other servers do not receive
any message from the writer. In r2, T1 crashes at the beginning of the partial run. Assume that the
writer fails at time t′ > tfailw . Let rd be a READ operation invoked by reader after time tfailw .
Since the only faulty server in r3 is T1, rd eventually completes, possibly after the messages in Xwr1
are delivered. Assume rd completes at time t2 and returns vR. Note, however, that all messages in
Xwr1 in r2 are causally preceded exclusively by the messages sent by B1 (which is the only server
to receive a message from the writer during wr1).
Let r3 be the partial run identical to r′1 except that in r3: (1) a READ operation rd is invoked
by the correct reader reader at t′ (as in r2), (2) due to asynchrony all messages sent by T1 to reader
and the other servers are delayed until after t2 and (3) at the beginning of r3, B2 fails maliciously:
B2 plays according to the protocol with respect to the writer, but to all other servers and reader,
B2 plays like it never received any message from the writer; otherwise, B2 respects the protocol.
Note that reader and servers Fw, and B1 cannot distinguish r3 from r2 and, hence, rd terminates
in r3 at time t2 (as in r2) and returns vR. By atomicity, as rd1 precedes wr1, vR must equal v1.
Now consider partial run r4, identical to r2, except that in r4: (1) wr1 is never invoked, (2)
B1 fails maliciously at the beginning of the r4, forges that it received a wr1 message from the
writer and, otherwise, B1 sends the same messages as in r3, and (3) T1 is not faulty in r4, but, due
to asynchrony, all messages sent by T1 to reader and the other servers are delayed until after t2.
The reader and the servers Fw and B2 cannot distinguish r4 from r2, so rd completes at time t2
and returns vR, i.e., v1. However, by safeness, in r4 rd must return ⊥. Since v1 6= ⊥, r4 violates
safeness. uunionsq
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C An inherent price of lucky reads
C.1 Preliminaries
In this Appendix, we answer the general question of the minimal number of servers under which an
atomic storage implementation can have (1) fast lucky READS whenever at most fr, fr ≤ t servers
fail, as well as (2) WRITES that always complete in at most two communication round-trips (we
simply say that an implementation features 2-round WRITES ). Namely, such implementations are
possible if and only if the total number of servers is at least 2t+ b+min(b, fr) + 1.
The above result applies to a restricted communication model, we call data-centric, in which
servers send messages only in response to clients’ messages, i.e., servers do not communicate with
other servers, nor they send unsolicited messages. In Appendix C.2, we modify our model of Sec-
tion 2 to formally define the restricted, data-centric model.
We proceed by proving, in Appendix C.3 that 2t + b + min(b, fr) servers are not enough to
enable an atomic storage implementation that would feature fast lucky READS whenever up to fr
servers fail as well as 2-round WRITES. The main idea underlying the proof of this lower bound
is the observation that we can build, starting from a run of the algorithm with a complete write
followed by a lucky read, a series of indistinguishable runs where we manage to completely erase
the steps taken in the second round of the write, hence leaving a subsequent, unlucky reader, with
the impossible task of determining a value simply by looking at the steps taken in the first round
of the write. These can be forged by malicious servers, in case there is an insufficient total number
of servers.
Finally, we prove in Appendix C.4 that 2t+b+min(b, f)+1 servers are sufficient. The intuition
of why an additional server circumvents the impossibility, which is thus key underlying our matching
algorithm, is the following. Basically, we ensure that, (a) in case b ≥ f , at least one correct server will
report to the unlucky reader those steps taken in the second round of the write that the preceding
lucky reader observed, and, (b) in case b < f , that at least b + 1 correct servers will report the
steps taken in the first round of the write, overwhelming malicious servers. The matching algorithm
that features both fast lucky READS despite the failure of fr servers and 2-round WRITES is very
similar to our algorithm of Section 3.
C.2 Restricted communication model
To formalize the model in which servers send messages only in response to the clients’ messages we
modify our model of Section 2 as follows.
A non-malicious server si may put the output messages in msetsi,c in step sp =< p,M > only
if si received in sp a message m ∈M sent by the client c.
In such a modified model, we define the notion of a communication round-trip as follows.
In every communication round-trip (we simply say round) rnd of an operation op invoked by
the client c:
1. The client c sends messages to all servers. This is indeed without loss of generality because we
can simply model the fact that messages are not sent to certain servers by having these servers
not change their state or reply.
2. Servers, on receiving such a message, reply to the reader (resp., writer) before receiving any
other messages (as dictated by our modified model).
3. When the invoking client receives a sufficient number of such replies, a round rnd completes.
Apparently, in this model, every (complete) operation completes in a finite number of rounds.
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C.3 Lower bound
Proposition 5. Let I be any implementation of a SWMR atomic wait-free storage, with the follow-
ing properties: (1) in any partial run in which at most fr servers fail, every lucky READ operation
is fast, and (2) in any partial run, every (complete) WRITE operation completes in at most two
communication round-trips. Then, S ≥ 2t+ b+min(b, fr) + 1.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is an atomic implementation I that satisfies Propo-
sition 5 such that S ≤ 2t+ b+min(b, f).
We partition the set of servers into four distinct blocks, denoted by T1 and T2, each of size at
most t, B of size at most b, and FB of size at most min(b, f). We consider only the case in which
f > 0, b > 0, since, in case f = 0 or b = 0, it is not difficult to see that Proposition 5 holds, as the
number of servers for any implementation I must conform with the optimal resilience lower bound
of S ≥ 2t+ b+ 1 [21]. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that each of the blocks
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the runs used in the proof of Proposition 5
To exhibit a contradiction, we construct a partial run of the implementation I that violates
atomicity. More specifically, we exhibit a partial run in which some READ returns a value that was
never written.
– Let run1 be the run in which all servers are correct except T1, which crashes at the beginning
of the run. Furthermore, let wr1 be the WRITE operation invoked by the correct writer in
run1 to write a value v1 6= ⊥ in the storage and no other operation is invoked in run1. By our
assumption on I, wr1 completes in run1, say at time t1 in at most two communication rounds.
Therefore, wr1 skips T1, and completes (at latest) after the writer receives the replies in round
2 from correct servers (FB, B, and T2).
– Let run′1 be the partial run that ends at t1, such that run′1 is identical to run1 up to time t1,
except that in run′1 server T1 does not crash, but, due to asynchrony, all messages sent by the
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writer to T1 during wr1 remain in transit. Since the writer cannot distinguish run1 from run′1,
wr1 skips T1 and completes in run′1 at time t1.
– Let the partial run run2 extend run′1 such that: (1) FB crashes at t1, (2) rd1 is a lucky READ
operation invoked by the correct reader r1 after t1, (3) according to the proposition, rd1 is fast
(since |FB| ≤ f) and completes at time t2, skipping FB, (4) no additional operation is invoked
in run2, (5) run2 ends at t2, (6) all messages that were in transit in run′1 remain in transit in
run2.
– Let run′2 be the partial run identical to run2 except that in run′2 server FB does not crash,
but, due to asynchrony, the message sent by r1 to FB during rd1 remains in transit. Since r1
and all servers, except FB, cannot distinguish run2 from run′2, rd1 completes in run′2 at time
t2 (note that, both in run2 and run′2, rd1 skips FB).
– Let run′′2 be the partial run that is identical to run′2 except that, in run′′2: (1) the writer crashes
during wr1 and its round 2 message skips FB (and T1). Since r1 and all servers, except FB,
cannot distinguish run′2 from run′′2, rd1 completes in run′2 at time t2 (note that, both in run′2
and run′′2, rd1 skips FB).
– Consider now a partial run run3 slightly different from run′′2 in which the writer (resp., r1)
crashes during the round 1 of wr1 (resp., rd1) such that the round 1 messages sent by the writer
(resp., r1) in wr1 (resp., rd1) skip {B, T1, T2} (resp., {FB,B, T2}). We refer to the state of FB
after sending the reply to the round 1 message of wr1 as to σ1. In run3, T2 crashes at the
beginning of the partial run. Assume that the writer crashes at time tfailw and that r1 crashes
at time tfailr > tfailw . Let rd2 be a READ operation invoked by the correct reader r2 6= r1
at time t′3 > max(tfailr , t2). Since the only (crash) faulty server in run3 is T2, rd2 eventually
completes, skipping T2. However, rd2 is not necessarily fast. Assume rd2 completes at time t3
after k communication rounds and returns vR.
– Let run4 be a partial run identical to run′′2 except that in run4: (1) a READ operation rd2 is
invoked by the correct reader r2 at t′3 (as in run3), (2) due to asynchrony all messages sent by
T2 to r2 are delayed until after t3 (i.e., until after kth round of rd2) and (3) at the beginning of
run4, B fails maliciously: it forges its state at t2 to σ0 (the initial state of servers); otherwise, B
respects the protocol (including with respect to the writer and the reader r1). Note that r2 and
the servers FB and T1 cannot distinguish run4 from run3 and, hence, rd2 completes in run4
at time t3 (as in run3), skips T2 and returns vR. On the other hand, r1 cannot distinguish run4
from run′′2 and, hence, rd1 is fast and returns v1. By atomicity, as rd1 precedes rd2, vR must
equal v1.
– Consider now partial run run5, identical to run3, except that in run5: (1) wr1 is never invoked,
(2) FB fails maliciously at the beginning of run5 (this is possible since |FB| ≤ b) and forges
its state to σ1 (see run3); otherwise, FB sends the same messages as in run3, and (3) T2 does
not crash in r5, but, due to asynchrony, all messages sent by T2 to r2 are delayed until after t3
(i.e., kth round of rd2). The reader r2 and the servers B and T1 cannot distinguish run5 from
run3, so rd2 completes at time t3, skips T2 and returns vR, i.e., v1. However, by atomicity, in
run5, rd2 must return ⊥. Since v1 6= ⊥, run5 violates atomicity.
C.4 Algorithm
We prove our lower bound of Appendix C.3 tight by proving the following proposition.
Proposition 6. There is an implementation I of a SWMR atomic wait-free storage, with the
following properties: (1) in any partial run in which at most fr servers fail, every lucky READ
operation is fast, (2) in any partial run, every (complete) WRITE operation completes in at most
two communication round-trips and (3) S = 2t+ b+min(b, fr) + 1.
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The algorithm that proves Proposition 6 is very similar to our algorithm of Section 3. The
differences are the following:
– WRITE operation. (1) W phase takes always two communication rounds (without using the
timer in any round), (2) servers do not maintain the variable vw and (3) the writer sends the
field frozen within the W message instead of PW message.
– READ operation. (1) Definition of the predicate fast() is modified (to facilitate the absence of
fast WRITEs and WRITES that complete in three rounds), and (2) writeback procedure takes
only two communication rounds (following the pattern of the WRITE implementation).
The entire modified pseudocode of our algorithm is given in Figures 6, 7 and 8. In the following,
in Appendix C.5, we prove that our modified algorithm satisfies Proposition 6.
Initialization:
1: pw := w := 〈ts0,⊥〉; ts := ts0; frozen := ∅;
2: ∀rj |rj ∈ readers : read ts[rj ] := tsr0
WRITE(v) is {
3: inc(ts);
4: pw := 〈ts, v〉
5: send PW 〈ts, pw,w〉 to all servers
6: wait for (reception of PW ACKi〈ts, newread〉 from S − t different servers si)
7: freezevalues()
8: w := 〈ts, v〉
9: send W 〈2, ts, pw, frozen〉 message to all servers
10: frozen := ∅
11: wait for reception of WRITE ACKi〈2, ts〉 message from S − t different servers si
12: return(OK) }
freezevalues() is {
13: (∀rj , |{i : (PW ACKi.ts = ts) ∧ ((〈rj , tsrj 〉 ∈
∈ PW ACKi.newread) ∧ (tsrj > read ts[rj ]))}| ≥ b+ 1 do
14: read ts[rj ] := b+ 1
st highest value tsrj
15: frozen := frozen ∪ 〈rj , pw, read ts[rj ]〉 }
Fig. 6. Proposition 6 algorithm: WRITE implementation (at the writer)
C.5 Correctness
We first prove atomicity and then we proceed to wait-freedom and complexity. Note that in order
for rd to return a value c.val, it is necessary that c ∈ C (lines 16-18, Fig. 7). Therefore, if some
complete READ returns c.val then c must satisfy one of the following predicates (line 16, Fig 7):
(1) safe(c) ∧ highCand(c), or (2) safeFrozen(c). For simplicity of presentation, in the following,
if c satisfies predicate (1), we simply say that c is live, and if c satisfies predicate (2), we say that
c is frozen.
Recall that, in the following, we assume S = 2t+ b+min(b, fr) + 1.
Lemma 9. No-creation. If a READ rd completes and returns some value v, then either v was
written by some WRITE or v is the initial value ⊥.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that some READ (by some reader rj) returns a value that is
neither ⊥, nor written by some WRITE. In that case, let rd be the first READ (according to the
global clock) to select such a value v at line 18, Fig. 7 at time tv (it is not difficult to see that such a
rd exists). Therefore, if any READ operation has written back a value up to tv, this value must have
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Definitions and Initialization:
1: readLive(c, i) ::= (pwi = c) ∨ (wi = c)
2: readFrozen(c, i) ::= (frozeni.pw = c) ∧ (frozeni.tsr = tsr)
3: safe(c) ::= |{i : readLive(c, i)}| ≥ b+ 1
4: safeFrozen(c) ::= |{i : readFrozen(c, i)}| ≥ b+ 1
5: fast(c) ::= (|{i : wi = c}| ≥ S − t− fr)
6: invalidw(c) ::= |{i : ∃c′ : readLive(c′, i)∧
∧(c′ts < c.ts ∨ (c′.ts = c.ts ∧ c′.v 6= c.v))}| ≥ S − t
7: invalidpw(c) ::= |{i : ∃c′ : pw[i] = c′∧
∧(c′ts < c.ts ∨ (c′.ts = c.ts ∧ c′.v 6= c.v))}| ≥ S − b− t
8: highCand(c) ::= ∀c′∀i : (readLive(c′, i) ∧ c′.ts ≥ c.ts ∧ c′ 6= c)⇒
⇒ invalidw(c′) ∧ invalidpw(c′)
9: tsr := tsr0; T := timer();
READ() is {
10: inc(tsr);
11: rnd := 0; pwi := wi := 〈ts0,⊥〉,rndi := 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ S;
12: repeat
13: inc(rnd); if rnd = 1 then trigger(T )
14: send READ〈tsr, rnd〉 to all servers
15: wait for READ ACKi〈tsr, rnd, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗〉 from S − t servers and
and (expired(T ) or rnd > 1)
16: C := {c : (safe(c) and highCand(c)) or safeFrozen(c)}
17: until C 6= ∅
18: csel := (c.val : c ∈ C) ∧ (¬∃c′ ∈ C : c′.ts > c.ts)
19: if (¬fast(c) or (rnd > 1)) then writeback(csel)
20: return(csel.val)
21: upon receive READ ACKi〈tsr, rnd′, pw′, w′, vw′, frozen′j〉 from si
22: if (rnd′ > rndi) then
23: rndi := rnd
′; pwi := pw′; wi := w′;
vwi := vw
′; frozeni := frozen′j }
writeback(c) is {
24: for round= 1 to 2 do
25: send W 〈round, tsr, c〉 message to all servers
26: wait for receive WRITE ACKi〈round, tsr〉 from S − t servers }
Fig. 7. Proposition 6 algorithm: READ implementation (reader rj)
been⊥, or it has been written by someWRITE. Without loss of generality, assume that v is returned
as v = c.val, where c.ts = ts. Then, according to the line 16, Fig. 7, for the timestamp value pair c
either safe(c) or safeFrozen(c) hold, i.e., either b+1 servers have sent a READ−ACKi message
containing c in either pw or w (safe(c)) fields, or frozenrj (safeFrozen(c)) field, including at
least one non-malicious server si. Note that non-malicious servers update their pw, w and frozenrj
fields only when they receive a PW or W message from the writer, or a writeback message (WB)
from the reader. Since until time tv no reader has sent any writeback message containing a value
that is neither ⊥ nor written by some WRITE, we conclude that c was written by some writer or
it was never updated by si, so it is ⊥. A contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 10. No ambiguity. No two non-malicious servers ever store different values with the
same timestamp.
Proof. Note that the writer never assigns different values to the same timestamp (lines 3-4, Fig. 6).
By Lemma 9, when (if) writing back a value, the readers always write back a value along with the
timestamp the writer assigned to it. Therefore, it is impossible that two non-malicious servers store
different values with the same timestamp in their pw, w or frozen∗ variables. uunionsq
Lemma 11. Non-decreasing timestamps. Non-malicious servers never replace a newer value
with an older one in their pw and w fields.
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Initialization:
1: pw,w, vw := 〈ts0,⊥〉; newread := ∅
2: ∀rj |rj ∈ readers : frozenrj .pw := 〈ts0,⊥〉; frozenrj .tsr := tsr0; tsrj := tsr0
3: upon reception of a PW 〈ts, pw′, w′〉 message from the writer do
4: update(pw, pw′); update(w,w′)
5: newread :=
S〈rj , tsrj 〉, for all rj such that tsrj > frozenrj .tsr
6: send PW ACKi〈ts, newread〉 to the writer
7: upon reception of a READ〈tsr′, rnd′〉 message from the reader rj
8: if (tsr′ > tsrj ) and (rnd′ > 1) then tsrj := tsr′ endif
9: send READ ACKi〈tsr′, rnd′, pw,w, vw, frozenrj 〉 to the reader rj
10: upon reception of a WB〈round, ts, c〉 message from rj or W 〈round, ts, c, frozen〉 message from the writer do
11: update(pw, c)
12: if round > 1 then update(w, c) endif
13: if sender = writer then ∀j : 〈rj , pw′j , tsr′j〉 ∈ frozen do
14: if tsr′j ≥ tsrj then frozenrj .tsr := tsr′j ; frozenrj .pw := pw′j endif
15: send WRITE ACKi〈round, ts〉 message to the sender
update (localtsval, tsval) is {
16: if tsval.ts > localtsval.ts then localtsval := tsval endif }
Fig. 8. Proposition 6 algorithm: code of server si
Proof. Obvious from server code inspection, Figure 8. uunionsq
Lemma 12. Frozen is concurrent. If a complete READ rd returns c.val, such that c is frozen,
then c is written by some WRITE wr concurrent with rd.
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction. Suppose wr is not concurrent with rd. There are two
possibilities: (1) wr precedes rd, and (2) rd precedes wr. Without loss of generality we consider the
case where the reader rj executes rd.
Consider case (1). Note that every READ by rj has its distinct, monotonically increasing times-
tamp. Let the timestamp for rd be tsrrd. A non-malicious server changes its tsrj variable only if
it receives the READ message from rj containing a timestamp greater than tsrj (line 8, Fig. 8).
Therefore, a non-malicious server sets tsrj to tsrrd only once rd started. In addition, the writer
“freezes” the value (the one written by wr) for tsrrd, at the end of the PW round of wr (and then
sends it within a W round of wr), only when the writer receives at least b+ 1 server PW −ACKi
messages in wr that contain the pair 〈rj , tsr′′〉 in the newread fields, where tsr′′ ≥ tsrrd and the
b + 1st highest value is tsrrd. Among these b + 1 tsr′′ values, at least one is from a non-malicious
server. Therefore, rd must have already started when the writer freezed the value for tsrrd. This is
a contradiction with the assumption that wr precedes rd.
Consider now case (2). Note that the writer sends the 〈rj , c, read − ts[rj ]〉 (lines 9 and 15,
Fig. 6) in the field frozen of the W message of wr. Note also that rd by rj returns c.val such
that c is frozen only if the latest copy of the variable frozenrj of at least b + 1 servers contains
frozenrj .pw = c and frozenrj .tsr = tsrrd, where tsrrd is a timestamp of rd. This includes at least
one non-malicious server si that updates its frozenrj variable only upon receiving the W message
sent during wr. Therefore, rd has not yet completed when wr was invoked. A contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 13. Locking a pw value. If a set X of at least t+ b+1 non-malicious servers set their
local variable pw such that pw.ts ≥ pw′.ts by time t′, then a complete READ rd invoked after t′
cannot return a value pw′′.val such that pw′′.ts < pw′.ts.
Proof. First, consider the case where pw′′ is live. Every server in X stores pw such that pw.ts ≥
pw′.ts before rd is invoked. In addition, the timestamps of pw variables at non-malicious servers
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are non-decreasing (Lemma 11). The response of each server in X to rd, if any, contains pw, such
that pw.ts ≥ pw′.ts. Since a reader in every round of READ awaits responses from S − t servers
(line 17, Fig. 7), at least b + 1 ≥ 1 servers from the set X will respond to every round of rd. Let
c be the smallest timestamp-value pair contained in the pw field of some response to rd from a
non-malicious server si, for which c.ts ≥ pw′.ts. We prove, by contradiction, that c is not invalidpw.
By definition of invalidpw, a set Y of at least S − b − t servers must have responded with values
c′ in their pw fields, such that c′.ts < c.ts ∨ (c′.ts = c.ts ∧ c′.val 6= c.val). Since X contains only
non-malicious servers and |X| ≥ t + b + 1, and as |X| + |Y | > S, X and Y intersect in at least 1
(non-malicious) servers, so at least one of the responses from Y is from the non-malicious server
sj that belongs to the set X. Therefore, pwj .ts ≥ c.ts and, thus, pwj .ts = c.ts ∧ pwj .val 6= c.val.
However, as both si and sj are non-malicious, this is impossible (Lemma 10). A contradiction.
Therefore, c where c.ts ≥ pw′.ts is not invalidpw and READ rd can not return any pw′′ such
that: (1) pw′′ is live, and (2) pw′′.ts < pw′.ts.
Now suppose that pw′′ is frozen. Let pw1.ts be the lowest timestamp of every pw.ts gepw′.ts
in X. Since non-malicious servers store only values written by some WRITE, we conclude that a
WRITE with a timestamp pw1.ts was invoked before rd. If rd returns pw′′ such that pw′′.ts <
pw′.ts ≤ pw1.ts, then a WRITE with a timestamp pw′′.ts precedes rd. This violates Lemma 12. A
contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 14. Locking a w value. If a set of X of at least t + 1 non-malicious servers have set
their local variables pw and w such that pw.ts ≥ w′.ts and w.ts ≥ w′.ts by time t′, a complete
READ rd invoked after t cannot return a value w′′.val such that w′′.ts < w′.ts.
Proof. First consider the case where pw′′ is live. Every server in X stores pw and w such that
pw.ts ≥ w′.ts and w.ts ≥ w′.ts before rd is invoked. In addition, the timestamps of variables pw
and w at non-malicious servers are non-decreasing (Lemma 11), each server inX, if it responds to rd,
its response in every round will contain pw and w, such that pw.ts ≥ w′.ts and w.ts ≥ w′.ts. Since a
reader in every round of READ awaits responses from S−t servers (line 17, Fig. 7), at least 1 server
from the setX will respond to every round of rd. Let c be the smallest timestamp-value pair returned
in the pw or w field by a non-malicious server si, for which c.ts ≥ w′.ts. We prove, by contradiction,
that c is not invalidw. By definition of invalidw, a set Y of at least S−t servers must have responded
with values c′ in their pw or w fields, such that c′.ts < c.ts∨ (c′.ts = c.ts∧ c′.val 6= c.val). Since X
contains only non-malicious servers and |X| ≥ t+1, |X|+ |Y | > S, so at least one of the responses
from Y is from the non-malicious server sj that belongs to the set X. Therefore, pwj .ts ≥ c.ts and
wj .ts ≥ c.ts and, thus, pwj .ts = c.ts∧ pwj .val 6= c.val or wj .ts = c.ts∧wj .val 6= c.val. However, as
both si and sj are non-malicious, this is impossible (Lemma 10). A contradiction.
Therefore, c where c.ts ≥ w′.ts is not invalidpw and READ rd cannot return any w′′ such that:
(1) w′′ is live, and (2) w′′.ts < w′.ts.
Now suppose that pw′′ is frozen. Let w1.ts be the lowest timestamp of every w.ts gew′.ts in X.
Since non-malicious servers only store values written by some WRITE, we conclude that a WRITE
with a timestamp w1.ts was invoked before rd. If rd returns w′′ such that w′′.ts < w′.ts ≤ w1.ts,
then a WRITE with a timestamp w′′.ts precedes rd. This violates Lemma 12. A contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 15. Atomicity of READ with respect to WRITEs. If a READ rd is complete and
it succeeds some complete wr =WRITE(v), then rd does not return a value older than v.
Proof. First note that the timestamps monotonically increase at the writer and all the values
that any reader returns (and, hence, all the values that it writes back) are written by the writer.
Therefore, timestamps associated to the values by the writer in line 4, Fig 6, order the values
that readers return. Now, we show that rd does not return c.val, such that c.ts < ts, where ts is
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associated to v in line 4, Fig 6 of wr = WRITE(v). We consider two cases: (1) c is live and (2) c
is frozen.
1. safe(c) ∧ highCand(c) (c is live). In this case, 〈ts, v〉 is written to pw and w fields of at least
S − t = t + b + min(b, fr) + 1 servers, out of which a set X, of size at least S − t − b =
t +min(b, fr) + 1, contains only non-malicious servers. We can apply Lemma 14 (w′.ts being
ts), and conclude that rd does not return a value with a timestamp less than ts, i.e., a value
older than v. Therefore, no c′ such that c′.ts < ts can satisfy the highCand predicate, and no
such c can be returned as live. A contradiction.
2. safeFrozen(c) (c is frozen). Due to lemma 12, c has been written by some WRITE wr′ concur-
rent with rd. Since (1) the writer assigns non-decreasing timestamps to values, (2) wr precedes
rd and (3) rd is concurrent with wr′, we conclude that wr precedes wr′ and c.ts > ts. uunionsq
Lemma 16. READ hierarchy. If a READ rd is complete and it succeeds some complete READ
rd′ that returns v′, then rd does not return a value older than v′.
Proof. Note that a complete READ rd does not write back a value c.val it returns in case rd is
fast, i.e., in case rd selects c at line 18, Fig. 7 at the end of first round (rnd = 1), and if fast(c)
holds. We now show that rd does not return c.val, such that c.ts < ts′, where ts′ is associated to
v′ in line 4, Fig. 6 of the WRITE that wrote v′. We consider two cases: the first where rd′ is fast
and the second in which rd′ is slow and writesback c′ = 〈ts′, v′〉 (lines 24-26, Fig. 7).
1. rd′ is fast. In this case, in rd′ a reader has received at least S−t−fr = t+b+min(b−fr, 0)+1 ≥
b+1 different server responses that contain c′ in their w fields. We consider two cases: (a) b < fr
and (b) b ≥ fr.
a. b < fr. In this case, in rd′ a reader has received at least b + 1 different server responses
that contain c′ in their w fields. This includes at least one non-malicious server. As malicious
servers change their w fields in the W round (or the second round of WB - write back by some
reader) only if the PW round (or the first round of WB) has already completed, i.e., if at least
S − t servers changed their pw field to c′. This includes a set X of at least S − t− b = t+ b+ 1
servers non-malicious servers. Applying Lemma 13, we conclude that rd returns a value c.val
such that c.ts ≥ c′.ts.
b. b ≥ fr. In this case, in rd′ a reader has received at least t+ b+1 different server responses
that contain c′ in their w fields. This includes at least t+1 non-malicious servers, that have set
their pw and w variables to c′. Hence, we can apply Lemma 14, and conclude that rd does not
return a value with a timestamp less than c′.ts, i.e., older than c′.val.
2. rd′ writesback the value. In this case, in rd′ the reader has completed writing back the value
c′.val and a set X of at least S − t − b = t +min(b, fr) + 1 non-malicious servers have all set
their pw and w variables to c′ at latest during rd′, i.e., before rd is invoked. Hence, we can apply
Lemma 14, and conclude that rd does not return a value with a timestamp less than c′.ts, i.e.,
older than c′.val. uunionsq
Theorem 6. Atomicity. The algorithm in Figures 6, 7 and 8 is atomic.
Proof. By Lemmas 9, 15 and 16. uunionsq
We proceed by proving the wait-freedom property.
Theorem 7. Wait-freedom. The algorithm in Figures 6, 7 and 8 is wait-free.
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Proof. The argument for the wait-freedom of a WRITE operation is based on the assumption that
there are at most t faulty servers. In every round of a WRITE, the writer waits for at most S − t
valid server responses that the writer is guaranteed to receive eventually.
The argument for the wait-freedom of a READ operation is slightly more involved. We prove
that, in every run, every READ operation rd invoked by the correct reader completes. Recall that,
by our model, in any run at most t servers can fail, out of which at most b can be malicious.
We distinguish two cases: (a) the case where the writer issues a finite number of WRITE
operations in the run, and (b) the case where there is an infinite (unbounded) number of WRITE
operations in the run.
Case (a) - Finite number of WRITES. In this case there is a WRITE operation with the highest
timestamp. Let wr denote the last complete WRITE operation that writes v with timestamp ts
(or v = ⊥, ts = ts0 if there is none. We denote with wr′ a possible later (incomplete) WRITE that
writes v′ with ts′.
Assume, by contradiction, that READ rd never returns a value. Then, rd invokes rounds on all
correct servers, sending 〈READ〉 messages infinitely many times. We distinguish two cases: (a.1)
value v′ is never pre-written (written in the pw fields) into more than b correct servers and (a.2)
there is a time t at which wr′ is pre-written into b+ 1 or more correct servers.
In case (a.1) let t be the time at which last correct server changed its pw to 〈ts′, v′〉 (by wr′
or an incomplete writeback that sends a WB message with a same timestamp-value pair). In both
cases, let t′ > t be the time at which rd received at least one response from every correct server
sent after t.
Consider case (a.1). First we prove that 〈ts, v〉 is safe. Since 〈ts, v〉 was written to pw and w
fields of at least S − t servers, out of which at least S − 2t = b +min(b, fr) + 1 are correct. Out
of these, no server ever changes its value w (as this would require that c′ is pre-written in at least
S− 2t = b+min(b, fr)+1 > b correct servers). Hence, from time t′ onward, 〈ts, v〉 appears at least
b+ 1 times in w[∗] and is safe.
Moreover, there are at least S − t responses in w[∗], from correct servers, with either 〈ts, v〉
or with a timestamp smaller than ts. Therefore, every timestamp-value pair c, such that c.ts >
ts ∨ (c.ts = ts ∧ c.val 6= v) is invalidw. Finally, there are at least S − t− b responses from correct
servers in pw[∗] with either 〈ts, v〉 or with a timestamp smaller than ts. Therefore, every timestamp-
value pair c, such that c.ts > ts ∨ (c.ts = ts ∧ c.val 6= v) is invalidpw. Thus, at the next iteration,
highCand(〈ts, v〉) and safe(〈ts, v〉) hold, 〈ts, v〉 ∈ C and rd returns, a contradiction.
Now consider case (a.2), where v′ is pre-written (by a WRITE or some READ) into b + 1 or
more correct servers. Then, after t′, 〈ts′, v′〉 appears at least b + 1 times in pw[∗] and is safe. It is
not difficult to see, as no subsequent valid value is present in the system, such that for every pair
c′′ such that c′′.ts > c′.ts ∨ (c′′.ts = c′.ts ∧ c′′.val 6= c′.val) invalidw(c′′) and invalidpw(c′′) holds.
Thus in the next iteration, 〈ts′, v′〉 ∈ C and READ returns: a contradiction.
Case (b) - Infinite number of WRITES. Note that, in this case, the writer is correct. Suppose, by
contradiction, that rd never completes. Let tsrj be the timestamp of rd (at the correct reader rj).
Note that the reader rj never invokes a READ rd′ with a timestamp tsr′j > tsrj , and therefore, the
writer cannot freeze a value (for the reader rj) for a READ with a higher timestamp than tsrj).
Since rj is correct, it invokes in rd an infinite number of rounds (rounds do not block as in every
round the reader awaits S − t responses). Eventually, rj writes tsrj to every correct server. Since
there are S − t = t + b +min(b, fr) + 1 correct servers, in the next WRITE round (as there is an
infinite number of WRITES, the writer executes an infinite number of WRITE rounds), the writer
reads tsrj from at least b+min(b, fr)+ 1 of these servers in the PW round, freezes the current pw
value (pw′) for the reader rj (it is not difficult to see that, for a particular read timestamp tsrj ,
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the writer freezes at most one value) and sends it within the W.frozen field in the W round of
that very same write. Since (1) the channels are reliable, (2) servers take into account W.frozen
fields of the old W messages of the writer, and (3) the writer is correct, eventually, every correct
server stores frozenrj = 〈pw′, tsrj〉. Since there are S− t = t+ b+min(b, fr)+1 correct servers, in
the next READ iteration, rj reads the same frozenrj = 〈pw′, tsrj〉 from at least b+min(b, fr) + 1
correct servers, pw′ becomes safeFrozen and rd terminates. A contradiction. uunionsq
Now we prove that our modified algorithm of Appendix C.4 has the following properties: (1)
in any partial run in which at most fr servers fail, every lucky READ operation is fast, (2) in any
partial run, every (complete) WRITE operation completes in at most two communication round-
trips. Since the property (2) is immediate, we prove that, if at most fr servers are faulty, every
lucky READ (i.e., the READ that is synchronous and contention-free) is fast.
Theorem 8. Fast READS. In the algorithm of Figures 6, 7 and 8, if a READ operation rd is
lucky and at most fr servers fail by the completion of rd, then rd is fast.
Proof. First, suppose that the last (complete) WRITE (wr) that precedes rd writes a timestamp-
value pair c (or c = 〈ts0,⊥〉 if there is no such WRITE). Since rd is contention-free, no other
WRITE is invoked before the completion of rd, and, hence, no other value stored by a correct
server has a timestamp higher than c.ts during the execution of rd.
Hence, c was written in the pw and w fields of at least S− t = t+ b+min(b, fr)+ 1 servers out
of which at least S− t− fr = t+ b+min(b− fr, 0)+1 ≥ b+1 are correct and respond with a valid
READ − ACK message in the first round of rd. Therefore, at the end of round 1, safe(c) and
fast(c) (line 5, Fig. 7) hold. Let c′ be any timestamp-value pair such that ∃i, readLive(c′, i), c′.ts ≥
c.ts ∨ (c′.ts = c.ts ∧ c′.val 6= c.val). Then, as there are no WRITES after wr that are concurrent
with rd, and as rd is synchronous, all S − fr ≥ S − t correct servers respond before the expiration
of the timer (and, hence, before the end of round 1) with timestamps less than c′.ts or with a
timestamp c′.val = c.ts and a value c.val 6= c′.val. Therefore, at the end of round 1, for every such
a timestamp-value pair c′, the predicates invalidw(c′) and invalidpw(c′) hold. Finally, predicate




In this appendix, we show how our SWMR atomic storage implementation can be transformed into
the SWMR regular storage implementation. An algorithm implements a robust regular storage if
every run of the algorithm satisfies wait-freedom and regularity properties. Here we give a definition
of regularity for a SWMR regular storage.
In the single-writer setting, the writes in a run have a natural ordering which corresponds to
their physical order. Denote by wrk the kth WRITE in a run (k ≥ 1), and by valk the value written
by the kth WRITE. Let val0 = ⊥. We say that a partial run satisfies regularity if the following
properties hold: (1) if a READ returns x then there is k such that valk = x, (2) if a READ rd is
complete and it succeeds some WRITE wrk (k ≥ 1), then rd returns vall such that l ≥ k, and (3) if
a READ rd returns valk (k ≥ 1), then wrk either precedes rd or is concurrent to rd.
The advantages of our regular storage implementation over our atomic one are the following: (1)
it tolerates an arbitrary number of malicious readers and (2) the number of actual server failures
every lucky operation can tolerate while still being fast is boosted to the maximum: in our regular
implementation every lucky WRITE is fast despite the failure of up to fw = t − b servers9 and
every lucky READ is fast despite the failure of fr = t servers.
In the following we prove:
Proposition 7. There is an optimally resilient implementation I of a SWMR robust regular stor-
age, such that: (1) in any partial run in which at most t − b servers fail, every lucky WRITE
operation is fast, (2) in any partial run in which at most t servers fail, every lucky READ operation
is fast, and (3) I tolerates arbitrary number of malicious readers.
D.2 Modifications to the Atomic Implementation
The algorithm A that proves Proposition 7, is obtained from our algorithm of Proposition 1,
Section 3 as follows: (1) W phase of WRITE operation takes only one instead of two rounds (line 9,
Fig. 1), (2) in the READ emulation, the writeback procedure is removed (lines 21 and 26-28, Fig. 2)
and (3) servers ignore every WB message sent by some reader rj . Note that in line 8, Figure 1, the
writer now checks if it has received PW −ACK messages from S − fw = t+ 2b+ 1 servers.
In the following we sketch the correctness proof for our regular implementation A.
D.3 Correctness
Lemma 17. In our regular implementation A, non-malicious servers only store values written by
the writer or 〈ts0, bot〉 in their pw, w and frozen∗ variables.
Proof. Obvious from the inspection of server code of Figure 3, as non-malicious servers ignore WB
messages sent by readers (see Appendix D.2). uunionsq
Lemma 18. No-creation. If a READ rd completes and returns some value v then either v was
written by some previous WRITE or v is the initial value ⊥.
Proof. Suppose that there is a READ rd that returns a value v that was not the initial value ⊥
nor written by some WRITE. Without loss of generality, assume that v is returned as v = c.val,
9 This is optimal, as proved in Proposition 3, Appendix A.
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where c.ts = ts. Then, according to line 18, Fig. 2, for the timestamp value pair c, either safe(c)
or safeFrozen(c) hold, i.e., b+ 1 servers have sent a message containing c in their either pw or w
(safe(c)), or frozen (safeFrozen(c)) fields, including at least one non-malicious server si. Since
non-malicious servers update their pw, w and frozen fields only when they receive a PW or W
message from the writer (Lemma 17), we conclude that c was written by some writer or it was
never updated by si, so it is ⊥. A contradiction. uunionsq
The proofs of the following lemmas follow the proofs of the respective lemmas for the atomic
implementation from Appendix ??.
Lemma 19. Non-decreasing timestamps. Non-malicious servers never replace a newer value
with an older one in their pw or w.
Lemma 20. Frozen is concurrent. If a complete READ rd by a correct reader rj returns c.val,
such that c is frozen, then c is written by some WRITE wr concurrent with rd.
Lemma 21. Locking a pw value. If a set of X of at least t + b + 1 non-malicious servers set
their local variable pw such that pw.ts ≥ pw′.ts at time t′, then a complete READ rd invoked by a
correct reader rj after t′ cannot return a value pw′′.val such that pw′′.ts < pw′.ts.
Lemma 22. Locking a w value. If a set of X of at least t+1 non-malicious servers have set their
local variables pw and w such that pw.ts ≥ w′.ts and w.ts ≥ w′.ts at time t′, a complete READ rd
invoked by a correct reader rj after t cannot return a value w′′.val such that w′′.ts < w′.ts.
Lemma 23. If a READ rd by a correct reader rj is complete and it succeeds some complete wr =
WRITE(v), then rd does not return a value older than v.
Theorem 9. (Wait-freedom.) The modified algorithm A of Appendix D.2 is wait-free.
Regularity is proven using the above lemmas.
Theorem 10. (Regularity.) The modified algorithm A of Appendix D.2 is regular.
Proof. By Lemma 18 and Lemma 23. uunionsq
We give detailed proofs of the fast WRITE and fast READ properties of our regular implemen-
tation.
Theorem 11. (Fast Writes.) Consider the modified algorithm A of Appendix D.2. If a complete
WRITE is synchronous and at most fw = t − b servers fail by the completion of wr, then wr is
fast.
Proof. As at most t− b servers are faulty and the WRITE is synchronous, the writer receives the
response from at least S − t + b = t + 2b + 1 servers in the PW round before the timer Timeout
expires (line 8, Fig. 1) and the WRITE completes in a single round-trip, before the second, W
phase (round). uunionsq
Theorem 12. (Fast Reads.) Consider the modified algorithm A of Appendix D.2. If a complete
READ operation rd is synchronous and contention-free (i.e., if rd is lucky), then rd is fast.
Proof. First, suppose that the last (complete) WRITE (wr) that precedes rd writes a timestamp-
value pair cpw. As rd is contention free, no other WRITE is invoked before the completion of
rd, and, hence, no correct server stores a value with a timestamp higher than cpw.ts during the
execution of rd.
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First, suppose that wr is a fast WRITE. Thus, cpw was written in the pw field of at least
S− fw = 2b+ t+1 servers out of which at least S− fw− t = 2b+1 are correct and respond with a
valid READ−ACK message in the first round of rd. Therefore, at the end of round 1, safe(cpw)
holds. Let c′ be any timestamp-value pair such that ∃i, readLive(c′, i), c′.ts ≥ cpw.ts ∨ (c′.ts =
cpw.ts ∧ c′.val 6= cpw.val). Then, as there are no WRITES after wr that are concurrent with rd,
and as the system is synchronous, all S − t correct servers respond before the expiration of the
timer (and, thus, round 1) with timestamps less than c′.ts or with a timestamp c′.val = cpw.ts and
a value cpw.val 6= c′.val. Therefore, at the end of round 1, for every such timestamp-value pair c′,
the predicates invalidw(c′) and invalidpw(c′) hold. Finally, predicate highCand(cpw) is true at the
end of round 1 of rd and rd returns cpw.val.
Now suppose that wr is a two-phase WRITE. Hence, cpw was written in the pw and w fields of
at least S− t = b+ t+1 servers out of which at least S− 2t = b+1 are correct and respond with a
valid READ−ACK message in the first round of rd. Therefore, at the end of round 1, safe(cpw)
holds. Let c′ be any timestamp-value pair such that ∃i, readLive(c′, i), c′.ts ≥ cpw.ts ∨ (c′.ts =
cpw.ts ∧ c′.val 6= cpw.val). Then, as there are no WRITES after wr that are concurrent with rd,
and as the system is synchronous, all S − t correct servers respond before the expiration of the
timer (and, thus, round 1) with timestamps less than c′.ts or with a timestamp c′.val = cpw.ts and
a value cpw.val 6= c′.val. Therefore, at the end of round 1, for every such timestamp-value pair c′,
the predicates invalidw(c′) and invalidpw(c′) hold. Finally, predicate highCand(cpw) is true at the
end of round 1 of rd and rd returns cpw.val. uunionsq
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E Contending With the Ghost
In this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 13. In the algorithm of Figures 1, 2 and 3, if the writer fails during an incomplete
WRITE wr′ at time T , then, for every reader rj, at most three synchronous READ operations
invoked by rj after T are slow.
However, we first prove a pair of lemmas.
Lemma 24. If the writer fails at time T during wr′ = WRITE(v′) and some slow READ rd
invoked after T returns v′, then every synchronous READ that succeeds rd is fast.
Proof. Assume that a timestamp ts′ is associated to v′ in line 4 of wr′. By atomicity, every syn-
chronous READ rd′ that succeeds rd may return only v′. Moreover, as correct servers store only
values written by some WRITE or ⊥, and as wr′ is the last WRITE invoked, no correct server ever
stores (in its pw, w or vw variables) a value with a timestamp higher than ts′. Since rd is slow,
it writesback the value and, when rd completes, a set X of at least S − 2t = b + 1 correct servers
store 〈ts′, v′〉 in their pw, w and vw fields. Since rd′ is synchronous, all servers from X respond
with pw = vw = vw = 〈ts′, v′〉 in the first round of rd′. Therefore, at the end of round 1 of rd′
predicates safe(〈ts′, v′〉) and fastvw(〈ts′, v′〉) hold. Moreover, it is not difficult to see that any
timestamp value pair c such that c.ts > ts′ or (c.ts = ts′) ∧ (c.val 6= v′) will be deemed invalidpw
and invalidw at the end of round 1 of rd′. Therefore, highCand(〈ts′, v′〉) holds and rd′ returns v′
without executing the writeback procedure, at the end of its first round. Therefore, rd′ is fast. uunionsq
Lemma 25. For every reader rj, if (1) the writer fails at time T during wr′ = WRITE(v′), (2)
the last complete WRITE wr writes v10, and (3) some slow READ rd invoked after T returns v,
then at most one synchronous READ rd′ by rj that succeeds rd is slow and returns v.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there are two synchronous READS rd′ and rd′′ by rj that
succeed rd and that are both slow and return v, and let rd′ precede rd′′. Assume that a timestamp
ts′ (resp., ts) is associated to v′ (resp., v11) in line 4 of wr′ (resp., wr). By atomicity, every READ
rd1 by rj that succeeds rd may return either v or v′. Moreover, as correct servers store only values
written by some WRITE or ⊥, and as wr′ is the last WRITE invoked, no correct server ever
stores (in its pw, w or vw variables) a value with a timestamp higher than ts′. Since rd is slow,
it writesback the value and, when rd completes, a set X of at least S − 2t = b + 1 correct servers
store either 〈ts, v〉 or 〈ts′, v′〉 in their pw, w and vw fields.
We distinguish three cases: (1) the case where, at the end of the first round of rd′, (a) at most
b correct servers have responded with pw∗ = 〈ts′, v′〉 and (b) no correct server had responded with
w∗ = 〈ts′, v′〉, (2) the case where, at the end of the first round of rd′, b+ 1 or more correct servers
have responded with pw∗ = 〈ts′, v′〉, and (3) the case where, at the end of the first round of rd′,
some correct server has responded with w∗ = 〈ts′, v′〉.
Consider case (1). Since no correct server responds with w∗ = 〈ts′, v′〉 in the first round of
rd′, no correct server responds with vw∗ = 〈ts′, v′〉 in the first round of rd′. Since all correct
servers respond in the first round of synchronous READ rd′, all servers from the set X respond
in the first round of rd′ with vw∗ = 〈ts, v〉. Therefore, at the end of round 1 of rd′, predicates
safe(〈ts, v〉) and fastvw(〈ts, v〉) hold. Consider any c such that readLive(c) and ((c.ts > ts) or
((c.ts = ts) ∧ (c.val 6= v)) holds. Since at least S − t correct servers respond in the first round of
rd′ and at most b of those respond with pw∗ = 〈ts′, v′〉, S − t − b correct servers respond with a
10 In case such a wr does not exist, ve denotes ⊥ as v.
11 In case v = ⊥, ts = ts0.
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timestamp-value pw such that pw.ts < ts′. Hence, it is not difficult to see that, at the end of round
1 of rd′, for any c, invalidpw(c) holds. Similarly, as no correct server responds with w∗ = 〈ts′, v′〉,
for any c invalidw(c) holds. Therefore, at the end of round 1 of rd′, highestV alid(〈ts, v〉) holds
and v is returned at the end of round 1 of rd′ and rd′ is fast. A contradiction.
Consider case (2). Obviously, at the end of round 1 of rd′ safe(〈ts′, v′〉) holds. Moreover, by
Lemma 2, the fact that no correct server ever stores a value with a timestamp higher than ts′ and
the fact that all (at least S − t) correct servers respond in the first round of rd′, at the end of
round 1 of rd′ for any c such that readLive(c) and ((c.ts > ts′) or ((c.ts = ts′)∧ (c.val 6= v′)) hold,
invalidpw(c) and invalidw(c) also hold. Hence, rd′ returns v′. A contradiction.
Finally, consider case (3). Since some correct server si responds in READ rd′ with w∗ = 〈ts′, v′〉,
and as rd′ precedes rd′′, by the time rd′′ is invoked, at least b + 1 correct servers have updated
their pw values to pw∗ = 〈ts′, v′〉. Since all correct servers respond in the first round of rd′′, by the
argument of case (2), rd′′ returns v′. A contradiction. uunionsq
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 13.
Let wr be the last complete WRITE (if it exists) that writes 〈ts, v〉. If wr does not exist, we
denote 〈ts0,⊥〉 as 〈ts, v〉. Assume, by contradiction, that there are four slow synchronous READS
invoked by some reader rj after T , rd1, rd2, rd3 and rd4 (by order of precedence). By atomicity,
all READS rd1 to rd4 return either v or v′. We distinguish two cases.
(1) rd1 returns v. In this case, by Lemma 25, at least one of the READS rd2 and rd3 is either fast
or returns v′. Since we assume that rd2 and rd3 are slow, at least one of the READS rd2 or rd3
returns v′. However, by Lemma 24, in any case READ rd4 is fast. A contradiction.
(2) rd1 returns v′. By Lemma 24, READS rd2, rd3 and rd4 are fast. A contradiction.
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